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UNRAVELING UNKNOWING JUSTIFICATION
Anthony M. Dillof*
Faust:... So, once again, who art thou?
Mephistopheles: A part of that power, which is ever willing evil and ever
producing good.'
INTRODUGTION
This Article concerns a narrow but significant topic in the theory
of criminal law-the problem of unknowing justification. Briefly
stated, the problem of unknowing justification is this: Should a defen-
dant be exonerated of an offense due to circumstances he was una-
ware of, where he would have been entitled to a justification defense
had he known of the circumstances? Examples quickly bring this con-
voluted question into vivid relief:
D1, a treacherous gold prospector, shoots his partner so he will not
have to share their newly discovered gold with him just before, un-
known to D1, his partner was to shoot him for the same reason.
D2, a vengeful farmer, torches a neighbor's wheat field ignorant
that the destruction of the field will create a firebreak which will
save a nearby town from an approaching forest fire.
D3, a racist police officer, arbitrarily arrests and restrains an African-
American woman unaware that she is the subject of an outstanding
arrest warrant.
Undoubtedly, had D1, D2, and D3 acted based on the surrounding
circumstances (the partner's imminent attack, the approaching forest
fire, the outstanding warrant), they would have been entitled to the
justification defenses of self-defense, necessity, and law enforcement,
respectively. Because they did not know of these justifying circum-
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. A.B.
1981, Harvard University; J.D. 1985, Columbia University School of Law; LL.M. 1996,
Columbia University School of Law. Howard Denmark, Stuart P. Green, George
Fletcher, and Kenneth W. Simons favored me with their thoughtful comments on
drafts of this Article.
1 JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GoETHE, FAUSr 44 (Abraham Hayward trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1993) (1833).
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stances, we might call D1, D2, and D3 "unknowinglyjustified." Should
we allow these actors to claim these justification defenses despite their
ignorance of the justifying circumstances, or should we deny them
these defenses due to their ignorance? Although there are sub-is-
sues,2 this is the principal question addressed herein.
The problem of unknowing justification has significant practical
and theoretical implications for the criminal law. Practically, of
course, we must decide what punishment, if any, to impose on the
unknowingly justified actor. Our criminal justice system is far from
ideal: criminal behavior is partially caused by social and economic in-
equities that the criminal law systematically discounts; limited re-
sources for factfinding inevitably produce erroneous verdicts;
inhumane and brutal conditions of confinement dehumanize inmates
and condition them to further brutality. For various likely familiar
reasons, these shortcomings are not easily remedied. In contrast, es-
tablishing just schedules of punishment is a matter directly within our
control. If a person, as a moral matter, deserves to have her sentence
decreased or nullified due to circumstances she was unaware of, the
criminal law should reflect this fact. We owe it to those defendants
who would be made to suffer unjustly otherwise. 3
2 The problem of unknowing justification has two main sub-issues: (1) If an un-
knowingly justified defendant is entitled to assert a justification defense against of-
fense 0, is she entitled to assert the defense against the charge of attempting 0 as
well, or will she be liable for attempting 0?; and (2) if an unknowinglyjustified defen-
dant is not entitled to assert a justification defense, are there any additional require-
ments besides knowledge, for example, justificatory purpose, that must be present in
order for her to be entitled to assert the defense? In other words, if knowledge of the
justifying circumstances is a necessary condition for asserting ajustification defense, is
it a sufficient one as well? See infra notes 47-51, 113-19 and accompanying text.
3 Cases of unknowingjustification are reported periodically. The most discussed
is Queen v. Dadson, 169 Eng. Rep. 407 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1850) (constable shoots fleeing
suspect unaware that criminal record of suspect licensed his action; justification de-
fense not permitted); see also Regina v. Thain, [1985] N. Ir. 457 (C.A.) (soldier shot
fleeing teen plead defense that he was unaware of circumstances that may have al-
lowed to him to use force to accomplish an arrest; justification defense permitted but
rejected on the facts). The most recently publicized occurred in 1997 when a petty
thief stole an innocent-looking backpack left in public. The thief discovered a terror-
ist bomb in the backpack, reported the bomb to the police, and saved many lives. See
Paul H. Robinson, The Bomb Thief and the Theory of Justification Defenses, 8 CRIM. L.F.
387, 387-89, 408 (1997) (thief not prosecuted). Other cases discussing issue of un-
knowingjustification are collected in 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 14
n.4 (1984). The frequency of cases of unknowing justification, of course, is irrelevant
to the question of what justice requires. The strength of an individual's right to ajust
punishment does not vary with the frequency that the state has occasion to violate it.
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On the theoretical level, the problem of unknowing justification
presents one of the fundamental questions of criminal law theory.
The concerns of the criminal law most naturally divide along the lines
of objective conditions relevant to offenses and defenses and mental
conditions relevant to inculpation and exculpation. Thus, a person is
generally liable if there are conditions relevant to an offense (such as
the fact that the goods being purchased are stolen) and she knows of
them; generally not liable if there are such conditions and she is una-
ware of them; generally not liable if there are conditions relevant to a
defense (such as the putative victim's consent) and she is aware of
them; but what if there are circumstances relevant to a defense which
she is unaware of? The situation may be represented diagrammati-
cally as follows:
Conditions of Conditions of
the Offense the Defense
Known Liability No Liability
Unknown No Liability
No theory of criminal law is complete unless it can provide an answer
to the problem of unknowing justification and so fill in the fourth
square.
As shall become apparent in the course of this Article, the ques-
tion mark in the fourth square implies profound questions for various
fields of inquiry. Expressed in moral terms, the question becomes,
what are we punishing for? Are we punishing people for harms they
have caused, the unjustified harms they have caused, the unexcused
harms they have caused, or something else? Expressed in terms of
criminal law theory, the question becomes, what is the structure of a
defense? Do defenses embody free-standing norms with objective and
subjective components, like offenses, or do they act instead as excep-
tions to offense norms, which are legally and logically prior? Ex-
pressed in terms of political theory, the question becomes whether it
is legitimate for the state to employ force against its citizens in the
absence of the breach of its rules of conduct. Finally, we are led to
think more deeply about why we exonerate in the typical case ofjustifi-
cation where the defendant knows of the justificatory circumstances.
Is it because of (1) the objective circumstances exclusively, (2) the
defendant's mental state exclusively, (3) both the objective circum-
stances and the defendant's mental state, each a sufficient, indepen-
dent and nonexclusive reason, or (4) the combination of the objective
circumstances and the defendant's mental state, neither alone being a
sufficient reason?
2002] 1549
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These questions have incited scholarly inquiry. Currently, how-
ever, there is no consensus concerning the correct resolution of the
problem of unknowing justification. One camp steadfastly holds that
the unknowingly justified actor should be completely exonerated;4 an
opposing camp disagrees and would impose full liability;5 a third
camp takes the intermediate position that the unknowingly justified
actor should be liable merely for attempting the offense. 6 In the face
of such scholarly dispute, one might be tempted to defer to the status
quo. Yet recourse to the wisdom of settled law to resolve the issue is
unavailing for the law's position on the issue is itself disputed. 7 Reso-
lution of the problem of unknowing justification thus would unify the-
orists and provide guidance to legislatures and courts.
4 See MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATION FOR CRIMINAL LAW 180-81 (1993) (arguing that the unknowingly justi-
fled defendant "has done no wrong"); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GEN-
ERAL PART 23-27 (2d ed. 1961); B. Sharon Byrd, Wrongdoing and Attribution:
Implications Beyond the Justfication-Excuse Distinction, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1289, 1314-16
(1987); Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories ofJustfication: Deeds v. Reasons, in HARM
AND CULPABILITY 45, 47 (A.P. Simester et al. eds., 1996) ("[W] here a person's conduct
in fact avoids a greater societal harm but the person is unaware of this, the conduct is
justified despite the actor's ignorance."); Robert F. Schopp, Justification Defenses and
Just Convictions, 24 PAC. L.J. 1233, 1267-82 (1993) ("J]ustification defenses should
not require internal justification based on justificatory knowledge.").
5 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 7.4 (1978); J.C. SMITH,
JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 41-44 (1989); Russell L. Christopher,
Unknowing Justification and the Logical Necessity of the Dadson Principle in Self-Defence, 15
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 251 (1995) (recommending the subjective approach);
Michael Corrado, Notes on the Structure of a Theory of Excuses, 82J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 465, 487-91 (1991) ("[Tlhere is a strange sense that it would be wrong to exoner-
ate someone who did not have the proper state of mind."); Kent Greenawalt, The
Perplexing Borders ofJustification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1897, 1916 n.55 (1984)
("[U]ustification in law should correlate more closely with moral appraisal."); Brian
Hogan, The Dadson Principle, 1989 CRIM. L. REv. 679, 686 (exculpating a defendant
based on an unknown justification seems "wholly bizarre"); A.P. Simester, Mistakes in
Defence, 12 OxFoRDJ. LEGAL STUD. 295, 303-04 (1992) (suggesting that the objective
approach may have the effect of "encouraging the commission of prima-facie offences
in the hope that they might turn out to be fortuitously defensible").
6 See Andrew Ashworth, Belief Intent and Criminal Liability, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 1, 28-29 (John Eekelaar et al. eds., 1987).
7 Based on the Model Penal Code and German authorities, Fletcher asserts that
"[t]he consensus of Western legal systems is that actors may avail themselves ofjustifi-
cations only if they act with a justificatory intent." FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 7.4, at
557. Robinson disagrees with Fletcher's interpretation of the Model Penal Code, see 2
ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 21 & n.18, and argues the American and English case law is
equally divided. See 2 id. at 23. He further claims that English and Welsh criminal
statutes would allow the defense. See Robinson, supra note 4, at 49.
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This Article will argue that, in general, the unknowingly justified
actor should not qualify for a justification defense. Thus it will reject
the so-called objective theories of justification, as well as the class of
punishment theories in which wrongdoing is the central organizing
principle. While wrongdoing is the critical concept for a theory of
criminal conduct, i.e., what acts should be prohibited or required, re-
sponsibility for causing harm, it will be argued, should be the basis of
criminal punishment, i.e., under what conditions sanction should be
imposed. Furthermore, between the remaining theories of justifica-
tion that would hold the unknowingly justified actor liable, this Article
will contend that the "subjective theory ofjustification" offers the best
account ofjustification in general and the problem of unknowing jus-
tification in particular. Where a harm has been caused, punishment is
always due unless the actor can show that he can be excused for caus-
ing the harm. Finally, although this Article supports the subjective
theory of justification, it supports a version that differs from the
Model Penal Code and other subjective justification theories. In par-
ticular, it advances a new mental state called "regarding" as the requi-
site for asserting a justification defense. Thus this Article's position,
by virtue of either its result or reasoning, is novel.
This Article begins in Part I with a brief discussion of its method-
ology, in which the moral nature of the inquiry is explicated. In Part
II, the principal theories of justification are briefly reviewed. In Part
III, a range of arguments on both sides of the unknowing justification
debate are examined and found wanting. Part IV presents an alterna-
tive view of unknowing justification. This position rests on a theory of
punishment called the "harm theory." Part IV elaborates the harm
theory, shows how it implies a rejection of the unknowing justification
defense, and demonstrates how the theory favorably compares with its
competitors.
I. A FEW WoRDs ABOUT METHODOLOGY
Three points about this Article's methodology are worth noting
at this juncture. First, this Article will discuss the problem of unknow-
ing justification as a question of morality (or ethics) set within the
context of the criminal law. In particular, this Article generally pro-
ceeds within the framework of objective retributivism, the theory that
considerations of desert are central to determining what sanctions
should be imposed on people, and that objective factors, such as an
act's consequences, are relevant to desert.8 Accordingly, a variety of
8 Objective retributivism is elaborated and defended by a variety of contempo-
rary scholars. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 5, at § 6.6, 466-73; Lawrence Crocker,
2002]
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contingent and pragmatic considerations not relevant to desert, such
as public response to acquittals based on the unknowing justification
defense and practical implications for code drafting, although inter-
esting in their own right, are not pursued.9 The answer to the purely
moral question whether, all things equal, an unknowingly justified ac-
tor should be exonerated is of some intrinsic interest and surely bears
powerfully upon what some may view as the "ultimate" issue: whether
particular jurisdictions should revise their penal codes to add, drop or
maintain an unknowing justification defense. Clearly the proper
moral resolution of the issue must be taken into account with empiri-
cal and practical issues at some point in a legislature's deliberations.
Second, as a moral question, the problem of unknowing justifica-
tion must at bottom be settled by appeal to moral intuitions. Sadly,
moral intuitions are not distinct, clearly labeled psychological entities
with special claims to truth or authority.10 They are just your/my/our
considered opinions about what is sound, decent, sensible, and just.
Accordingly, the problem of unknowing justification in theory could
be solved simply by focusing narrowly on an instance of unknowing
justification and asking, "Is it sound, decent, sensible, and just to de-
crease or nullify the defendant's sentence here?" This Article's length
may therefore seem suspect. Moral intuitions, however, are not so eas-
ily ascertained, nor so readily compartmentalized. True, there is no
logical connection between the problem of unknowing justification
and, for example, theories of self-defense, utilitarianism, causation,
and attempts-all topics discussed herein. The latter theories do not
entail a position on unknowingjustification. But moral deliberation is
more a matter of analogy than logic. Analogies may be distant but
nonetheless useful in answering moral questions. Furthermore, the
integration of moral intuitions into a coherent comprehensive theory
is an independent goal recommending the interplay of disparate theo-
Justice in Criminal Liability: Decriminalizing Harmless Attempts, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057
(1992); Michael Davis, Why Attempts Deserve Less Punishment Than Complete Crimes, 5
LAW & PHIL. 1 (1986); Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdo-
ing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL Issus 237, 263-70 (1994). For a discussion of retributive
theories of punishment in general, see R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in
the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME &JusT. 1, 25-32 (1996).
9 For a thorough discussion of these issues, the interested reader should consult
Robinson, supra note 4.
10 But Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRAcTIcAL REASON (Lewis White Beck ed.
& trans., Macmillan Pub'g, 3d ed. 1993) (1788) (arguing that moral truth is accessible
through reason's commitment to the categorical imperative); G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA
ETHICA (Thomas Baldwin ed., 1959) (1903) (arguing that moral truth is a nonnatural
quality that must be perceived via a special human faculty).
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ries." A plausible picture of our moral intuitions is that they are like
nodes of a large web, each connecting to, supporting, and influencing
some set of nearby intuitions, which in turn connect to, support and
influence a more distant set. I2 Because the state of every node has a
more or less attenuated effect on every other, the range of starting
places for cogent analogy and argument on a particular moral ques-
tion cannot be limited in advance. Thus, discussions of the problem
of unknowing justification, like morality in general, may be as far
ranging as the participants' ingenuity and patience. At a minimum,
there is the project of reviewing, tracing, and debunking the alleged
connections that others have drawn between the problem of unknow-
ing justification and other issues of moral, political, and criminal
theory.
Third, although this Article engages in a moral examination of
justification, it is the legal, not the moral concept of justification, that
is being examined. An examination of the moral concept ofjustifica-
tion would elaborate under what conditions a person who prima facie
deserves punishment should not be punished because she is 'Justi-
fied." In contrast, an examination of the legal concept ofjustification
from a moral perspective considers under what conditions a person
who has satisfied the definitional elements of an offense should be
able to assert ajustification defense. 13 Such an account is general in
two senses. First, it applies to all justification defenses without regard
to whether any particular justification defense is morally correct. A
theory of legal justification should permit agreement on the general
structure of a justification defense, such as defense of property, even
if, for example, it is disputed whether one should be permitted to use
deadly force to protect one's property. Second, an account of legal
justification should be general in the sense that it applies to all of-
fenses, regardless of whether those offenses, for example drug use, are
11 Cf RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 176-224 (1986) (arguing that integrity is
an independent virtue for legal systems).
12 Cf. W.V. QUINE, WEB OF BELIEF 9-12 (1970) (describing how our interlocking
set of beliefs are assessed in light of each other);JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUsTICE 48
(1971) (discussing how considered judgments and regulative principles are assessed
in light of each other).
13 The definitional elements of an offense specify (1) the required mental state,
(2) the prohibited conduct, and (3) the attendant circumstances of an offense-for
example, (1) knowingly (2) summoning the fire department (3) in the absence of a
fire or other emergency. The definitional elements do not contain the absence of
those conditions that would establish an affirmative defense to the offense, however
those conditions might be defined. While the absence of such conditions may for-
mally be a material element of the offense, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(10)(ii)
(1962), their absence is best considered an extra-definitional material element.
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morally valid. In sum, a theory of legal justification is a moral inquiry
into the general structure ofjustification defenses as they may apply to
the general range of offenses and defenses.
II. THREE THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION
This Part briefly introduces the major theories ofjustification and
indicates how they would resolve the problem of unknowing justifica-
tion. An understanding of these theories and their terminology is im-
portant for the ensuing discussion.
According to the first theory-the "objective theory of justifica-
tion"-persons who commit offenses should be held legally justified
and not liable where their conduct has been determined to be permis-
sible (or preferable).14 Whether conduct is permissible is generally
not a function of the mental state of the actor, which is instead rele-
vant to the actor's culpability for the conduct, but is purely a function
of "objective" factors, such as whether the conduct was consented to
or advanced a significant social interest. Thus, under the objective
theory, a person's mental state will be irrelevant to whether the per-
son is legally justified. For example, if A used force against B and so
prevented B from injuring C, A would be legally justified, and held
not liable for assault, in both the cases where A knew of B's contem-
plated attack and A did not know of B's contemplated attack. By defi-
nition, the objective theory of justification would render the
14 Theorists differ on whether justified conduct is merely conduct that should be
engaged in or whether it includes conduct that may, but need not, be engaged in. See
Greenawalt, supra note 5, at 1904-07 (discussing problematic cases involving accept-
able but not ideal behavior); Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and
Culpability, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1551, 1560 n.25 (1999) (elaborating on a range of
possible positions available on the question). For example, if a run-away trolley car is
headed toward A and could be rerouted to head toward B creating the same danger
to human life, from a purely utilitarian perspective, all other things equal, rerouting
the car is neither required nor prohibited-it is simply permissible. More generous
theories ofjustification would hold that rerouting the car is justified because the alter-
native of no action is not morally preferable; more restrictive ones would hold that it
is unjustified because it is not morally preferable to the alternative of no action. The
Model Penal Code appears to adopt the latter version by limiting the necessity de-
fense to cases where the act at issue avoids a "greater" evil than the one caused.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) (a) (1962). None of the arguments in this Article de-
pend on whether a generous or a restrictive version of justification is correct. For
ease of exposition, I will refer to justified conduct as conduct that is "permissible,"
leaving open the question whether in order for it to be permissible it also must be, in
some sense, preferable.
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unknowingly justified actor not liable. In the United States, Professor
Paul Robinson has been a major proponent of this theory.' 5
According to the second theory of justification-the "subjective
theory"-persons satisfying the definitional elements of an offense
should be held legally justified and not liable based on their mental
state only. Depending on the particular form of the subjective theory
at issue, the mental state of the actor establishing justification will be
either believing, knowing, hoping, intending, or desiring that the con-
duct at issue is of a type which is, in fact, socially desirable or permissi-
ble. Thus, for example, if A used force against B believing such force
was needed to prevent B from injuring C, A would be considered le-
gally justified, and held not liable for assault, in both the cases where
B was about to attack C and where B was not about to attack C. By
definition, under the subjective theory, the unknowingly justified ac-
tor, lacking the appropriate subjective state, would not qualify for a
defense and would be held liable. The Model Penal Code, construed
literally, adopts such a theory of justification.16
According to the final theory-the "mixed theory of justifica-
tion"-in order to be held legallyjustified, and hence not liable, per-
sons satisfying the definitional elements of an offense must both
engage in socially permissible conduct and believe that they are so
engaged (or possess the appropriate exculpatory mental state, how-
ever defined). A would be considered justified in using force against
B only if A was correct in believing that his use of force would have a
socially desirable effect. Regarding the unknowingly justified actor,
the mixed theory would follow the subjective theory of justification in
holding her not legally justified and therefore liable on the ground
that she lacked the proper subjective state. The mixed theory and the
subjective theory, however, diverge with respect to the "mistakenlyjus-
tified actor." Where a person incorrectly believes that he is acting in a
15 See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 3, § 122; Paul H. Robinson, A Theory ofJustification:
Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266 (1975) Robin-
son, supra note 4.
16 Sections 3.02-09 of the Model Penal Code consistently employ subjective ter-
minology, for example, "the use of force... is justifiable when the actor believes...."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962); see also 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTA-
RIES §§ 3.01 to 5.07 at 11, (1985) ("If a druggist who sells a drug without a prescrip-
ton is unavare that the recipient requires it immediately to save his life, the actual
necessity of the transaction will not exculpate the druggist."). Although the Model
Penal Code justification chapter contains a definitional provision employing objective
terminology, see id. § 3.11(1) ("force... not amounting to a privilege"), the defined
term "unlawful force" is incorporated within the Code's generally subjective provi-
sions. Thus, for a defendant to establish a justification, the Model Penal Code re-
quires simply a subjective belief in an objective condition.
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manner that is socially permissible, the subjective theory would find
the actor justified; in contrast, the mixed theory would describe the
person as either putatively justified or excused. Professor George
Fletcher is a major American proponent of the mixed theory of
justification. 17
III. CURRENT ARGUMENTS ABOUT UNKNOWING JUSTIFICATION
This Part of the Article considers six leading arguments concern-
ing the problem of unknowing justification and attempts to expose
the shortcomings of each.
A. The Definitional Argument
A threshold argument that must be considered, and dismissed, is
based on the definitions of such terms as ':justified," "permissible,"
and "excused." Although this argument is primarily addressed against
the subjective theory of justification, and I shall speak of it in such
terms, it also has some application against the mixed theory of
justification.
As discussed above, the subjective theory of justification rejects
the possibility of unknowing justification. Yet it may be contended
that, in this respect, the subjective theory is erroneous, conceptually
confused, or at least at odds with accepted usage on three grounds.
The first ground is that the subjective theory asserts oxymoronically
that an actor who is justified unknowingly is not justified at all. An
actor, it might be added, cannot be both justified and not justified at
all. To avoid this apparent difficulty, the subjective theory should be
thought of as asserting more precisely that the actor whose conduct is
unknowingly permissible may not establish that he is thereby entitled
to the so-called legal defenses ofjustification, such as self-defense and
necessity. The subjective theory of justification thus distinguishes be-
tween the legal status of conduct (improper vs. permissible) and the
criminal status of the defendant (liable vs. legally justified). Under
the subjective theory, an actor may engage in legally justified conduct
but not be entitled to a justification defense.
A second ground for describing the subjective theory as concep-
tually confused rests on a semantic stipulation. Writing in another
context, Douglas Husak asserts, "By definition, no instance of permissi-
17 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BAsIc CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 101-06 (1998);
FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 7.4; George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason:
A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 UCLA L. REV. 293 (1975).
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ble conduct should be subject to punishment."I s Because unknow-
ingly justified actors engage in permissible conduct, Husak's
definition implies that the subjective theory, holding that such actors
should be subject to punishment, is erroneous.
Husak's definition should be set aside for the purpose of investi-
gating the problem of unknowingjustification. Definitions can never
settle substantive disagreements nor should they force one party to
state her position in a manner requiring substantial redefinition of
her framework. Adopting Husak's definition would force the propo-
nent of the subjective theory, who believes the unknowingly justified
actor should be subject to punishment for her conduct, to character-
ize such conduct as impermissible based in part on the actor's subjec-
tive state. But this would be inconsistent with accepted usage
according to which subjective states, such as awareness of the conse-
quences of a person's act, bear on the actor's culpability for the act,
not the wrongfulness or permissibility of the act itself.19 The proposi-
tion that "no instance of permissible conduct should be punished"
(which is denied by the subjective theory ofjustification) should be a
matter of substantive debate, not of definition.
Finally, the subjective theory may be thought to characterize erro-
neously asjustifications what are by definition excuses. The subjective
theory would allow justification defenses to be established based on
the defendant's beliefs about his conduct. According to Husak, most
criminal law theorists accept as a matter of definition that
"U] ustifications are defenses that arise from properties or characteris-
tics of acts; excuses are defenses that arise from properties or charac-
teristics of actors."20 Under the plausible assumption that subjective
states are properties of actors, not acts, the subjective theory ofjustifi-
cation thus would systematically mislabel justifications as excuses.
Again, for the purpose of this discussion, this Article rejects Husak's
definition. In general, definitions should maximize agreement and
isolate differences, rather than foist an inapt vocabulary on one of the
parties to the disagreement. Whether legal justifications should be a
matter of objective and/or subjective facts should be left an open
question at the outset.
To summarize, in order for the problem of unknowing justifica-
tion to be discussed, the meaning of some terms must be fixed at the
18 Douglas N. Husak, Justifications and the Criminal Liability ofAccessories, 80J. GRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 491, 500 (1989) (emphasis added).
19 See MIcHAL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME 406 (1997) (explaining why mental
states such as emotions are not relevant to wrongdoing).
20 Husak, supra note 18, at 496.
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outset and others must be resolved through inquiry. By 'Justified con-
duct," this Article refers to conduct that possesses the necessary objec-
tive features to qualify for being legally permissible. Whether such
conduct, regardless of the actor's subjective state, morally should al-
ways provide actors a legal defense and whether only defenses based
on such conduct alone should be classified as justifications are open
questions.
B. The Logical Consistency Argument
Russell Christopher has recently advanced a novel and powerful
argument concerning the problem of unknowing justification.2 1 Like
the definitional argument discussed above, Christopher's argument
concerns the logical consistency of a theory of justification.22 Unlike
the definitional argument, however, Christopher's argument is di-
rected against the objective theory ofjustification-the theory that ac-
tors should be relieved from liability based solely on the objective
features of their conduct.23 Furthermore, unlike the definitional ar-
gument, Christopher's argument is not based on a superficial conflict
of the definitional terms. Rather, Christopher's argument purports to
demonstrate that the objective theory contains a deep, uncorrectable,
and unnoticed structural flaw. 24 According to Christopher, this struc-
tural flaw is manifested in the form of a paradox when the objective
theory is applied to certain cases of unknowing justified conduct.25 If
Christopher's argument is sound, the objective theory of justification,
as well as the mixed theory perhaps, 26 would have to be discarded in
favor of the subjective theory of justification. Accordingly, the un-
knowingly justified actor would be fully liable.
21 See generally Russell L. Christopher, Mistake of Fact in the Objective Theory ofJustifi-
cation: Do Two Rights Make Two Wrongs Make Two Rights... ?, 85J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOL-
oGY 295 (1994) [hereinafter Christopher, Mistake of Fact] (arguing that objective
theories of unknowing justification should be modified to reflect a reasonable stan-
dard); Russell Christopher, Self-Defense and Defense of Others, 27 PHiL. & PUB. Arr. 123
(1998) (applying the Dadson principle to the paradox of unknowing justification may
resolve inherent contradictions); Christopher, supra note 5 (challenging the logical
consistency of Fletcher's objective justification defense).
22 See Christopher, Mistake of Fact, supra note 21, passim.
23 See id. at 320-30.
24 See id.
25 See id. at 298.
26 Christopher expands the scope of his argument to include mixed theories. See
id. at 295. Christopher contends mixed theories, insofar as they contain an objective
component, are open to the same criticisms that undermine the objective theory. See
id.
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1. The Paradox
Christopher's argument for the inconsistency of the objective the-
ory is based on the following hypothetical:
Suppose that D, unaware of V's imminent attack on D, attacks V out
of spite. V, unaware of D's imminent attack, attacks D out of spite.
D and V each use similarly harmful force against the other at the
same time.27
Although Christopher does not color in the body of the hypothetical,
we might think of two people drinking at a bar. As they drink, an
argument develops and escalates. Carried away in anger, they simulta-
neously swing and land blows to the side of the other's head. In initi-
ating his punch, neither knew the other was doing the same.
In developing the paradox, Christopher's first step is to argue
that under an objective theory ofjustification, D appears legally justi-
fied, and hence not criminally liable. 28 Although D was unaware of
V's imminent attack, the objective fact of V's imminent attack appar-
ently renders D "unknowingly"justified in using force against V Cer-
tainly if D knew of V's imminent attack and sought to defend himself,
his use of force in self-defense would have been justified. The objec-
tive theory, in essence, treats this absence of knowledge as irrelevant.29
So D's use of force against Vseems like it should be legally justified.
Next, Christopher points out, D's and V's positions are symmetrical.30
D's and V's actions toward each other and beliefs about each other
are, per hypothesis, identical. What goes for one legally must go for
the other logically. Under the objective theory, therefore, it would
seem that Vis also justified in his use of force, albeit unknowingly, just
as D is.
The penultimate step of Christopher's argument is to show the
incoherence of this conclusion. Christopher asks, how can D be justi-
fied in using force against V, based on V's imminent attack, given that
V's attack is, as we have seen, itself apparentlyjustified?3I As a general
matter, it seems inappropriate to allow the use of force against ajusti-
fled use of force. For example, the explanation for why an accomplice
cannot use force to prevent a police officer from subduing his partner
in crime is that the police officer's use of force was justified, and the
defense of third parties cannot be triggered by the justified use of
force. Fletcher has advanced the "one Right thesis," which asserts that
27 Christopher, supra note 5, at 241.
28 See i&
29 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
30 See Christopher, supra note 5, at 242.
31 See ii
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in any situation of zero-sum conflict between two actors, only one can
be justified.32 Intuitively, the claim is plausible because ifjustification
requires objectively right conduct, in any conflict it is impossible that
both sides be objectively right. Robinson, among others, supports the
thesis.33 Consistently with these theorists, positive law restricts the
range of attacks that force can justifiably be used against to those that
are either unlawful or at least believed to be unlawful.34
For the final step in Christopher's analysis, we must return to the
initial hypothetical. If D and Vcannot both be justified in their use of
force, perhaps they are both unjustified. But if V's use of force is
unjustified, how can D's use of force against V also be unjustified?
Generally speaking, preventing unjustified force is justified. Under
objective theories of justification, D's and V's motivations are irrele-
vant. Assuming V's force is unjustified seems to entail that D's isjusti-
fled. But obviously the conclusion that one actor's use of force is
unjustified but the other's is not contradicts the basic factual symme-
try of the initial hypothetical.35
It seems then that under an objective theory ofjustification, both
D and Vcan neither be justified nor unjustified. Yet this is paradoxi-
cal for it seems that those who engage in prima facie illegal conduct
must be either legally justified or not. The source of this paradox,
Christopher concludes, is the objective theory ofjustification. 36 Thus,
the theory must be rejected (along with the possibility of unknowing
justification which only it permits).37
An analogy may help to illustrate the paradox that Christopher
asserts plagues the objective theory of justification. Christopher's hy-
pothetical generates a paradox by combining three essential elements.
First, the hypothetical involves two actors who appear to be placed
32 See George P. Fletcher, The Psychotic Aggressor-A Generation Later, 27 ISRAEL L.
REV. 227, 236-37 (1993); see also George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98
HIARv. L. REV. 949, 978 (1985) (stating that incompatible justifications are "logically
impossible" under an objective theory).
33 See 1 ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 165 ("Where an aggressor has a justification
defense, the proper rule is clear: justified aggression should never be lawfully subject
to resistance or interference." (footnote omitted)).
34 Self-defense, as the doctrine is traditionally formulated, is limited to the use of
force to prevent "unlawful bodily harm." 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 649 (1986); see MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04, 3.11 (1962)
(permitting the use of force against that believed to be threatening and unlawful, and
defining unlawful force, in part, as not privileged).
35 See Christopher, supra note 5, at 243-44.
36 See id. at 245-47.
37 See id. at 250-51; see also Christopher, Mistake of Fact, supra note 21, at 310-12,
320-25.
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symmetrically with respect to all features relevant to the objective the-
ory ofjustification. Thus, both must be either justified or unjustified
according to the objective theory of justification. Second, the situa-
tion is one of mutual dependency, that is, the status of each use of
force as justified or not depends on the status of the other use of
force. Third, the dependency of each use of force is inverse; that is, if
one use of force is justified, the other must be unjustified, and if one
use of force is unjustified, the other must be justified. The situation
may be likened to that of the two sentences below:
The sentence to the right is false. The sentence to the left is false.
First, by symmetry either they are both true or both false. Sec-
ond, the sentences are mutually dependent. Because the sentences
are about each other's truth, the truth of one sentence is based on the
truth of the other. Third, they depend inversely on one another in
the sense that if one statement is true, the other, asserting the first's
falseness, must be false, and vice-versa. Thus, if they are both true,
they are accordingly both false, or if they are both false, they must,
contrary to hypothesis, both be true-a paradox. If the objective the-
ory of justification applied to situations of unknowing justification re-
sults in a characterization of the situation structurally similar to the
sentences above, the theory must be defective. A minimum require-
ment for a theory ofjustification is that it is able to determine whether
an actor is justified or not. If the objective theory of justification is
defective, the unknowingly justified actor cannot claim a legal justifi-
cation and must be punished. In this manner, Christopher claims the
ambitious goal of solving the apparently moral dilemma of unknowing
justification through logical analysis alone.38
38 Christopher's paradox is based on an example involving potential claims of
self-defense. The paradox, however, arguably infects other defenses as well. For a
fee, Dennis will take persons to hunt eagles, a protected species. One day, Dennis
takes Otto hunting. Dennis is unaware that Otto is an undercover police officer. In
order to maintain his cover and advance the investigation, Otto shoots and kills an
eagle. Dennis is charged With the killing of the eagle based on a theory of accomplice
liability which imputes the act to him. Otto of course would not be liable for illegally
killing the eagle based on the defense of law-enforcement. May Dennis take advan-
tage of the law-enforcement defense that shields Otto? From a purely objective ap-
proach to justification, it may seem that there is no wrongful act to impute to Dennis
because the killing was an instance ofjustified law-enforcement conduct. But if Den-
nis cannot be convicted, then it seems that the killing was not objectively justified
because it, in fact, did not lead to Dennis's conviction. But if it was not objectively
justified (and since Dennis, unlike Otto, cannot assert an excuse or subjective justifi-
cation), Otto should be convicted-a paradox!
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2. Paradox Lost
Through careful distinctions, the pinch of Christopher's paradox
may be avoided. If D and Vuse similar force in attacking each other,
there are two possibilities: the force each uses can either (1) have no
effect on the force used by the other and so not at all prevent the
force used by the other, or (2) partially prevent the force used by the
other. Obviously, the force each uses cannot wholly prevent the other
force because, per hypothesis, the two similar forces actually occur.
Let us examine both cases of no-effect and partial prevention. If
the forces have no effect on each other, neither force is justified. Im-
agine that the attack that D and V plan to launch on each other con-
sists of a punch to the head followed by a kick to the shins a moment
later. D and Vpunch each other simultaneously and, notwithstanding
the punch they have received, deliver the kick exactly as they had
planned. Whether D's and V's use of force is justified, of course, de-
pends on what it is for force to be justified. Without canvassing all
substantive theories of justification in general, or self-defense in par-
ticular,39 it can generally be said that justified action either has some
overriding social utility or, at a minimum, violates nobody's rights. D's
and V's attacks clearly lacked social utility. They were not effective in
preventing D or Vfrom being injured. From a utilitarian perspective,
they merely caused gratuitous pain. Furthermore, the attacks violated
D's and V's general rights to bodily integrity. A person engaging in
an unjustified attack arguably forfeits certain moral rights to bodily
integrity. That forfeiture, however, is not absolute but limited to the
right not to be subjected to force that would prevent an unjustified
attack. The essentially preventative nature ofjustified force is demon-
strated by the general requirement that the force employed in self-
defense not exceed that which is necessary.40 Under any consistently
objective theory ofjustification, force is necessary only if it in fact con-
tributes to the goal of self-defense. The force used by D and V did
not. Having no useful effect and violating the rights of the persons it
39 For a survey of the theories explaining why self-defense is justified, see gener-
ally SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING (1994); Stuart P. Green, Castles and
Carjackers: Proportionality and the Use of Deadly Force in Defense of Dwellings and Vehicles,
1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; and Nancy M. Omichinski, Comment, Applying the Theories of
Justifiable Homicide to Conflicts in the Doctrine of Self-Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1447,
1447-53 (1987).
40 See 1 LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 34, at 649 (stating that permissible force is
that which is "necessary to avoid th[e] danger"); see also UNIACKE, supra note 39, at
213 ("[I]f you use force beyond what is necessary to resist, repel, or ward me off....
then you wrong me.").
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was used against, the force could not be justified in the objective sense
of the term (although the force might well have been excused).41
Consider now the case where the forces at issue partially prevent
each other. All cases of partially prevented force can be analyzed as
cases involving a force with two parts: an actual part that was not pre-
vented and a hypothetical part that was prevented. Imagine that D
and Vagain plan to launch limited attacks on each other consisting of
a punch to the head followed by a kick to the shins a moment later. D
and V simultaneously punch each other and slightly stunned, halt
their partially completed attacks. Here the punches were justified.
They prevented the other person from kicking. Furthermore, the
kicks, if they had occurred, would clearly have been unjustified. They
could not have done any good because there was no further attack for
the kicks to prevent. The kicks, if they had occurred, would have been
analogous to the ineffective punches considered earlier. Paradoxes
only appear to arise when it is insisted that the contemplated attack,
defined as a combined punch and kick, must be wholly justified or
unjustified. No act or series of acts can be both wholly justified and
unjustified. As the analysis shows, however, simultaneous partially suc-
cessful attacks have conceptually severable aspects: that which occurs
and is justified and that which is prevented and which, if it had oc-
curred, would have been unjustified. There is no reason not to en-
gage in this conceptual severance as a device to avoid paradox.
Furthermore, because the only part of the attack that actually oc-
curred was the punch, that is the only part of the attack the status of
which as justified or unjustified is at issue.42 It is justified, and so, if
41 With respect to cases where force has no preventative effect, another argument
is open to Christopher. Besides forfeiting a right not to have defensive force used, an
unjustified attacker also forfeits his right not to suffer punishment for his unjustified
use of force. Thus, it could be argued that D's and V's uses of force were potentially
justified as punitive measures against the other's use of force (unless of course, the
other's use of force was itself ajustified punitive measure). In most cases, however,
private citizens are not legitimate agents of punishment. Private punitive force, at
least in a society having criminal laws, is improper vigilantism. Furthermore, if D's
and V's use of force is understood as potentially justified punitive acts, their status as
justified or not becomes moot. If they were justified, the state would have no interest
in punishment, and if unjustified, the state would also have no interest because pun-
ishment was already imposed. Finally, if force is not imposed for the right reason, it
arguably cannot qualify as punitive. A fleeing criminal struck by lightning cannot
avoid further punishment on the ground that being hit by lightning was a punitive
measure.
42 Some cases are more conceptually difficult to divide into prevented and not
prevented parts. A and B each plan to strangle the other to death. They simultane-
ous put their hands around the other's neck and squeeze, strangling each other into
unconsciousness. The analysis is the same as the text example. Both acts of strangula-
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there are no remaining requirements that are not met, the actor
would be entitled to a justification defense.
At bottom, the reason that Christopher's paradox fails is that the
requirement of mutual dependency identified in the previous section
is not met. The status of an actual use of force as justified or not
depends on the status of the force that it prevented. The status of this
prevented force, however, does not depend on the status of the force
that was actually used to prevent it. Rather, the status of the pre-
vented force depends on the status of the hypothetical force, if any,
that it would have prevented if it (the prevented force) counterfactu-
ally had occurred. (For example, D's punch to V's head was justified
because the force it prevented, V's kick to D's shin was unjustified.
V's kick to D's shin, if it had occurred, would have been unjustified
because the only act it would have prevented, say, D's clutching his
head in pain, would have been justified.) The status of this hypotheti-
cal force, likewise, is not a function of the force actually used to pre-
vent it, but a function of the sur-hypothetical force, if any, that it
would have prevented. In this way, in order to determine whether
force is justified or not, a series of counterfactual scenarios must be
unraveled until an initial unjustified use of force is identified.
3. The Recursive Structure of Justification
Understood in this light, "an unjustified attack" pursuant to the
objective theory may be coherently defined as "an attack that does not
prevent an unjustified attack." Notice that this definition incorporates
the term "unjustified attack"-the very term to be defined. Neverthe-
less, the definition is noncircular and unambiguously divides all at-
tacks into unjustified and justified ones, thus avoiding Christopher's
objections. This point may be demonstrated by analogy. The defini-
tion of "an unjustified attack" as "an attack that does not prevent an
unjustified attack" is strictly analogous to the definition of "an odd
positive number" as "a positive number that does not immediately fol-
low an odd positive number." This definition noncircularly differenti-
ates odd positive numbers from even positive numbers despite
employing an "odd positive number" in the definition. Observe:
1 is an odd positive number because it is a positive number and the
number it immediately follows, 0, being nonpositive, is not an odd
positive number;
tion were justified. They each prevented further strangulation causing death. Stran-
gulation to death would have been unjustified because strangulation into
unconsciousness was sufficient to prevent the unjustified strangulation to death.
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2 is not an odd positive number because it immediately follows 1, an
odd positive number (by prior step), rather than a number that is
not an odd positive number;
3 is an odd positive number because it is a positive number, and the
number it immediately follows, 2, is not an odd positive number (by
prior step); etc.
The definition is noncircular and stable because it includes a con-
cept-"immediately follows"-that has a fixed endpoint (1 does not
immediately follow any positive number). In mathematics, such a def-
inition employing a fixed endpoint and an iterative rule for successive
terms is called a "recursive" definition.43 As discussed above, two at-
tacks cannot prevent each other. Furthermore, an infinite regress of
preventative attacks (A prevented B, which would have prevented C,
which would have prevented D, ad infinitum) is impossible. There-
fore, any chain of preventative attacks must have a fixed endpoint-an
attack which would be unproblematically unjustified because it would
not have prevented any other attacks. All other potential attacks by
that person would, through the operation of the definition, also be
characterized-determinately and unambiguously-as unjustified.
Justification in the criminal law is thus saved from fatal circularity by
its recursive structure.
In sum, despite Christopher's ingenious arguments, the objective
theory is at least logically coherent enough to provide a basis for exon-
erating the unknowingly justified actor.
B. Special Treatment Argument
In the course of his writings, Fletcher advances a number of argu-
ments in favor of his mixed theory of justification, the theory that for
an act to be justified it must be both objectively justified and so under-
stood by the actor. In Rethinking Criminal Law, the argument for re-
quiring some subjective state on which Fletcher seems to place
greatest weight concerns justifications' status as exceptions. Accord-
ing to Fletcher, justifications "represent exceptions to prohibitory
norms."44 "As exceptions," Fletcher writes, "these claims should be
available only to those who merit special treatment. '4 5 Because merit
43 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 1273-74 (Anthony
Ralston ed., 2d ed. 1983); see also NIGEL CUrLAND, COMPUTABILrrY. AN INTRODUCTION
TO RECURSIVE FUNCTION THEORY 32 (1980) (discussing noncircularity of recursive
definitions).
44 FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 7.4, at 565.
45 Il.; see also FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 106.
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implies a personal worthiness, Fletcher concludes that the require-
ment of merit makes the actor's subjective state relevant.46
1. Unclear Mental State
One critique of Fletcher's position is presented by Professor
Robinson. According to Robinson, Fletcher's position must be re-
jected because it is hopelessly unclear what type of subjective state
would be required to "merit" a justification defense.47 In order to in-
voke the defense, Robinson presses, must the defendant merely know
of the existence of the justifying circumstances, or must he act with
justificatory intent (the intent that the act produce the result underly-
ing the justification) ?48 For example, is it sufficient that the defen-
dant merely knew he would save a third party from an aggressor, or
must he in acting have intended to save the third party? If knowledge
is sufficient, one might further ask, should acting with a somewhat
lesser degree of confidence, such as "strong suspicion," also suffice? If
the actor must have intended the result, is intent a matter of ultimate
motive or mere purpose?49 If motive, is a but-for motive or merely a
contributing motive needed? These questions may stymie the propo-
nent of a subjective or mixed view of justification. The lack of an ar-
gument specifying the precise mental state or states required would
seem to undercut the claim that a mental state is required in the first
place.
There appears to be a ready response to Robinson's questions
about mental state. In order to establish a claim ofjustification under
a mixed theory ofjustification, the proponent of the mixed or subjec-
tive theory should require whatever mental state would suffice to es-
tablish a defense in cases of putative justification. (A putative
justification is generally defined as an exculpatory mistake as to the
existence ofjustificatory circumstances.) A shoots B, who clearly ap-
pears to be attacking him. B, however, is not attacking A. What
mental state does A need to establish self-defense as a putative justifi-
cation? Does A need to shoot for the purpose of saving his own life?
46 See FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 7.4, at 565-66.
47 2 ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 18 ("Ultimately, there seems no clear answer to
what is to be required by ajustificatory purpose requirement.").
48 2 id. at 17.
49 The distinction between motivation and purpose is a familiar one in criminal
law. Motivations underlie purposes, although they sometimes are identical in con-
tent. For example, in purposely saving another's life, one may be motivated either by
the saving of another's life or by the reward that is expected to follow from the saving
of another's life. See Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoreti-
cal Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1015, 1065-67 (1997).
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Must this be A's sole or primary motivation? If A's belief that B is
attacking will suffice, with what degree of confidence must this belief
be held? Are the answers to these questions affected if A's purpose is
not to shoot B but A's shooting of B is a side effect of A's true goal?
These questions turn upon subtle and interesting issues of culpabil-
ity.50 Yet even those who hold an objective theory ofjustification, such
as Robinson, need an answer to these questions, for nobody wishes to
deny the validity of putative justification. The required mental state
for putative justification Will likely be identical to the mental state re-
quired for actual justification under a mixed or subjective theory.
Clearly, the mental state needed for a mixed theory of justification
should be no more restrictive than that needed for putative justifica-
tion; that would unfairly penalize a defendant who had the mental
state for putative justification, but not actual justification under the
mixed theory, on the basis of the fortunate occurrence ofjustificatory
circumstances. The other half of the biconditional is a little less clear.
Might a mental state unable to support a claim for putative justifica-
tion suffice to establish the moral merit needed for a justification de-
fense? While no compelling argument can be given in answer to this
question, Ockham's razor51 suggests that there should not be two dis-
tinct types of merit: that sufficient for a putative justification and that
sufficient for true justification. What will do for putative justification
seems adequate for truejustification. The lack of an independent the-
ory of merit for true justification is not a strong objection to Fletcher's
mixed theory of justification.
2. Further Argument Required
A second argument advanced by Robinson is more convincing.
Robinson objects to Fletcher's requirement of merit on the ground
that it is conclusory. Robinson asks, "[w]hy cannot one as properly say
50 See, e.g., I.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY & CRIMINAL LIABiLrry. PHILOSOPHY OF
ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 109-10 (1990) (reviewing the "consequentialist" view
of criminal agency); Gerald Dworkin, Intention, Foreseeability, and Responsibility, in RE-
SPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 338, 339-47 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed.,
1987) (arguing there is a moral distinction between direct intent and indirect intent);
H.L- Hart, Intention and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSILrr. ESSAYS IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 113, 122-25 (1968) (criticizing doctrine of double effect as a
basis for making moral judgments); Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Conse-
quences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 334, 335-41 (1989) (review-
ing the doctrine of double effect).
51 Named for the philosopher William of Ockham, Ockham's razor refers to the
principle that "entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily." THE CAMBRIDGE DIC-
TIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 545 (1995).
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that the privilege to violate a norm is available to all those who by
doing so in fact avoid a greater harm or evil than that sought to be
prevented by the prohibitory norm? '52 Just as royalty may acquire
privilege through the fortunate accident of being born to noble par-
ents, Robinson might argue, so would-be criminals may acquire the
privilege to engage in prima facie criminal conduct through the fortu-
nate accident of acting in justificatory circumstances. Whatever spe-
cial treatment is claimed by the unknowingly justified actor can be
claimed based on the special circumstances of the actor's conduct.
Furthermore, to the extent that lack of personal merit is a morally
relevant factor, the criminal law can respond to this lack of merit by
convicting the unknowingly justified actor for attempting the offense
he believed he was committing. At least under subjective theories of
attempt liability, an actor's lack of personal merit manifested by his
intent to engage in a wrongful act is a ground for some punishment.
At a minimum, Fletcher should provide additional argument to sup-
port his requirement of merit.
C. Conflicting Norm Argument
Fletcher offers a second, more interesting argument in support of
his view that an appropriate subjective state is needed to supplement
justified conduct in order for an actor to qualify for a justification
defense. The special treatment argument characterized justifications
as mere exceptions to prohibitory norms. 53 Justifications seemed
merely to express the limits of prohibitory norms. Prohibitory norms
were thus implicitly ontologically prior and primary in the way that
there can be rules without exceptions, but not exceptions without
rules. In contrast, the conflicting norm argument characterizes justifi-
catory norms as ontologically equal and substantively superior to pro-
hibitory norms. Fletcher writes that
the logic ofjustification is more complicated than simply tagging on
negative elements to the definition of the offense. Claims ofjustifi-
cation represent conflicting norms that collide with the prohibition
of the offense and under circumstances prevail over the prohibi-
tion. For example, the commandment to observe the Sabbath con-
flicts with the imperative to protect human life, and the latter will
typically prevail. 5 4
Fletcher thus perceives a symmetry between prohibitory norms,
such as do not kill, which are codified as criminal offenses, andjustifi-
52 2 ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 26.
53 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
54 FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 104.
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catory norms, such as prevent unlawful killings, which are codified as
justification defenses.55 This symmetry, Fletcher contends, extends to
justificatory norms having objective and subjective components as pro-
hibitory norms do. 56 Just as a prosecutor may not charge a criminal
offense unless the actor has some mens rea with respect to prohibited
conduct, so too a defendant may not raise a justification defense un-
less she has the appropriate subjective state with respect to the justifi-
catory circumstances. Of course, unlike prohibitory norms,
justificatory norms are permissive, not mandatory, in form. The crimi-
nal law generally does not require, but only permits, that force be
used to prevent unlawful aggression. 57 Nevertheless, the permissive
nature ofjustificatory norms has never been thought to be key in un-
derstanding whether a subjective component is necessary to invoke
them as defenses. Ifjustificatory norms were mandatory, the same is-
sue whether they could be fulfilled unknowingly would arise.
Robinson has criticized Fletcher's mixed theory ofjustification on
the ground that it is an unprincipled amalgam of objective and subjec-
tive theories of justification that does not rest on a general theory of
liability.58 This criticism may be elaborated in the following way: it is
unclear what the moral significance of knowingly engaging in justified
action could have for a criminal justice system. In cases of putative
justification, an actor mistakenly believes that he is acting in ajustified
manner. Where this belief is reasonable, all agree that the actor
should not be liable. The reason is that the actor is not culpable for
his wrongful conduct by virtue of his commendable subjective state.
Where the actor reasonably and correctly believes that his conduct is
justified, again, all agree that the actor should not be liable. But why?
Proponents of the subjective theory ofjustification believe the reason
is the same as for the putatively justified actor, to wit, no moral culpa-
bility by virtue of his commendable moral state. Proponents of the
objective theory believe the primary reason is that no wrongful con-
duct has occurred and a sufficient, albeit secondary, reason is that the
55 See id. at 105.
56 See id. at 105-06.
57 Although justifications are permissive in form, there are limited factual settings
where engaging in conduct falling within an offense definition may be mandatory. If
A sets fire to a warehouse and B, a security guard suffering burns, runs out, A may be
required to steal a car to take B to the hospital, assuming no other means of helping
B are available.
58 See Robinson, supra note 4, at 68 ("[The mixed theory of justification] seems
internally inconsistent in its view on the significance of resulting harm and on the
sufficiency of culpability for full liability.").
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actor is not morally culpable. 59 If asked the content of this claim that
there are two sufficient reasons for exoneration, proponents of the
objective theory could coherently respond with the counterfactual as-
sertion that even if the actor had acted for a malicious purpose, she
should still be exonerated. In the case of the knowingly justified ac-
tor, proponents of the mixed theory reject as an independent reason
for exoneration that the conduct is not wrongful (the objective theory
position). To distinguish themselves from subjective theorists, how-
ever, they must find that the fact that the conduct was objectively justi-
fied is somehow morally relevant. But it is unclear what the content of
this claim could be. What possible contribution to justification could
the fact that the conduct was not wrongful be making without re-
course to the counterfactual claim (unavailable to mixed theorists)
that "in the absence of knowledge, exoneration would still be appro-
priate?" That the actor's conduct was actually justified seems a make-
weight, a third wheel, a fact not doing any moral work because the
actor's subjective state is sufficient to avoid liability.60
The virtue of the conflicting norms argument is that it suggests a
picture of how justifications work that responds to the criticism above.
Consider the case of a person who burns the field of another in order
to create a firebreak which will save a town from an oncoming forest
fire. On the conflicting norm picture, the person has violated the
prohibitory norms not to destroy the property of another rather than
fallen into an exception to it. Because he did so intentionally, he
should be blamed for violating the prohibition. But the person has
also prevented the town from being destroyed. Having complied with
the justificatory norm of preventing greater evil, he, by symmetry, de-
serves praise or credit. Indeed, the praise or credit he is due is greater
than the blame he is due for the destruction of the field because the
town's survival is morally more important than the field's. Under this
picture, knowingly justified conduct precludes criminal liability be-
cause the credit it entails outweighs the blame entailed by the breach
of the prohibitory norm. In this light, it can clearly be seen why actors
who are unknowinglyjustified may not escape criminal liability. While
blameworthy for engaging in prohibited conduct, they cannot claim
credit for the justificatory circumstances or results. The notion of at-
tribution, central to desert-based theories of criminal liability, under-
59 See generally Douglas N. Husak, The Serial View of Criminal Law Defenses, 3 Cram.
L.F. 369 (1992) (discussing traditional prioritizing of objectively based defenses over
subjectively based ones).
60 A similar objection to Fletcher's theory may be raised by Robert Schopp. See
Schopp, supra note 4, at 1277 (describing the requirement of knowledge as
"redundant").
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writes the mixed theory ofjustification. Just as persons should not be
punished without some culpability-establishing mental state, so
Fletcher might argue, persons should not receive credit withoutjustifi-
catory knowledge or purpose. This claim is confirmed by our moral
practices. An "accidental hero" will not receive the same type of
praise as one who has also acted from heroic ideals. Imagine a
drunken reveler on a yacht who throws a life preserver overboard in
jest; the life preserver lands in the hands of a drowning child who had
fallen into the water unobserved and who is thereby saved. The type
of praise due the accidental hero, if any, is a shallow or mock type of
praise, analogous to the disapproval due a person who has caused
great harm, but clearly through no fault of her own. Just as the crimi-
nal law does not recognize this disapproval through sanctions, so, it
might be argued, it should not register the weak praise due the un-
knowingly justified actor.
There is a difficulty, however, with the conflicting norm's concep-
tualization ofjustification (as I have elaborated it above).61 The diffi-
culty is that it is not thoroughly consistent with objective retributivism.
According to objective retributivism, persons deserve punishment
based on their culpability for wrongful conduct.62 Attempts to com-
mit offenses are punished because attempting an offense is wrongful,
though not as wrongful as successfully completing the offense. 63 As a
corollary, credit is deserved for attempting to cause a desirable result,
although not as much credit as for successfully causing a desirable
result. This corollary squares with our moral practices. A person may
be praised for swimming out to save a drowning child but will be
treated as a hero only if she succeeds. Pursuant to this view of desert,
a person who committed an offense and successfully achieved a so-
cially beneficial result should be treated differently than a person who
committed the same offense but failed to achieve a socially beneficial
result. For example, if Al should not be punished for causing the
death of ninety-nine people where Al did so in a reasonable and suc-
cessful effort to save one hundred lives (the credit being just sufficient
to offset the blame), then it would seem that A2 should be punished
for causing the death of ninety-nine people where so doing was a rea-
sonable, but wholly unsuccessful, effort to save one hundred lives.
The blame generated by killing ninety-nine would not be outweighed
61 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
62 See Moore, supra note 8, at 237 (distinguishing culpability and wrongdoing as
independent bases of desert).
63 See Crocker, supra note 8, at 1063, 1096 (arguing that the punishing of unsuc-
cessful attempts is based on their wrongful imposition of harm on their intended
targets).
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by the credit generated by merely attempting to save one hundred,
which would be far less than the credit for actually saving the lives.
But this conclusion is flawed. We feel that A2, just as Al, should not
be liable. The conflicting norm conceptualization of the mixed the-
ory of justification thus cannot be correct. Justifications are not sim-
ply norms like prohibitory norms, generating credit instead of blame.
The moral significance of justifications, unlike prohibitions, does not
vary with whether the intended results occurred. Asymmetries in our
intuitions about the significance of unsuccessful attempts and putative
justifications block any effort at conceptualizing justifications as full-
fledged norms comprised of objective and subjective elements.
D. The No-Harm Argument
Let us now shift to the first of two arguments advanced by Profes-
sor Robinson in support of the objective theory ofjustification and the
availability of justification defenses to unknowing actors. In an early
statement of his views, Robinson argues that liability is inappropriate
in cases of unknowing justification because (1) harm is a prerequisite
for criminal liability, and (2) in cases of unknowing justification, there
has been no harm.64 This argument seems incomplete at best. Robin-
son relies on the example of a maliciously set fire to a field which saves
a town from destruction. Robinson argues, "since no harm has oc-
curred, the incident should be of no concern to the criminal law." 65
Nevertheless, it seems difficult to deny that the field owner has been
harmed by the loss of his field. Perhaps Robinson means that there
has been no societal harm in the sense that society, as a whole, has not
been harmed but has benefited. This manner of characterizing the
events seems to imply an artificial and somewhat totalitarian personifi-
cation of "society" as the true concern of the criminal law. A more
traditionally liberal, and arguably superior, understanding of the
criminal law is that it is concerned with citizens as individuals and only
derivatively with society, conceived of as an aggregate of individuals.
Any alternative characterization which slights the harm to individual
citizens is flawed. Alternatively, Robinson may simply mean that
where the act is approved of, there should be no punishment. But
why? It appears that Fletcher accurately characterizes Robinson's dis-
cussion as a work of scholarship internal to the criminal law.66 Robin-
son seems primarily concerned with arguing that punishment of the
unknowingly justified actor would be inconsistent with what he terms
64 See Robinson, supra note 15, at 288-91.
65 Id. at 290.
66 Fletcher, supra note 17, at 294-95.
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the "accepted role"67 of the criminal law and less concerned with de-
fending that accepted role as a matter of justice.
E. Failed-Attempt Analogy Argument
In a more recent writing, Competing Theories ofJustification, Robin-
son explicitly makes the claim that the objective theory ofjustification
is more just than the mixed or subjective theories of justification. 68
His argument is straightforward. Robinson's premise is objective re-
tributivism, the view that resulting harm is at least sometimes relevant
to determining the amount of punishment that should be imposed.69
Robinson argues by analogy. In Case 1, D1 maliciously attempts to
ignite the field of his neighbor but does not succeed. In Case 2, D2
unknowingly saves a town by maliciously burning the field and thereby
creating a firebreak that prevents a forest fire from reaching the town.
According to Robinson, just as the objective occurrence of the failure
to ignite the field in Case 1 decreases Dl's penalty to, at most, at-
tempted arson, so the objective occurrence of the saving of the town
in Case 2 should allow D2 to invoke the necessity justification and
decrease his penalty to, at most, attempted arson.70 For Robinson,
what is critical about each case is the absence of net social harm.7' In
a reformulation of his earlier position of societal harm as a prerequi-
site for criminal liability, Robinson now contends that net societal
harm is what triggers potential criminal liability.72 In Robinson's view,
Case 1-a case of failed attempt-and Case 2-a case of unknowing
justification-simply represent different but morally equivalent ways
that a person intent on an act that he believes will cause net social
harm could fail to produce net social harm.73
The flaw in Robinson's argument is its explicit reliance on the
notion of net social harm. Although Case 1 and Case 2 share the ab-
sence of net social harm, Robinson has not established that net social
harm is the relevant concept for determining what punishment a per-
son deserves. Indeed, the concept of net social harm seems irrelevant
to the inquiry. Consider the doctrine of transferred intent. Pursuant
67 Robinson, supra note 15, at 266.
68 See Robinson, supra note 4 at 61-67. In Competing Theories of Justification,
Robinson makes a variety of other arguments. See id. These arguments do not speak
to the justness of the objective theory of justification, the principal concern of this
Article.
69 Id. at 56.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 45.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 57-58.
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to this doctrine, if A shoots at B intending to kill her, but instead hits
and kills C, an unforeseeable bystander, A will be held liable for mur-
der. Although the doctrine's place in criminal law is well estab-
lished,7 4 whether the doctrine is just is controversial. 75 The core
objection is that A did not intend, and could not foresee, C's death
and so should not be held responsible for it. There is a perceived lack
of concurrence between the harm intended and the harm caused
which occurs in paradigm cases of personal responsibility. C's death
seems an unforeseeable, albeit a tragic, accident, and the criminal law
generally does not hold persons liable for accidents, even when the
persons are of bad character.76 Furthermore, although A intended to
cause a net social harm (B's death) and did cause a net social harm
(C's death), this concurrence of intent and result is not considered
sufficient to bring the accidental death within the responsibility-con-
ferring paradigm of concurring intended and actual harm. The rea-
son is that in order to establish this concurrence of intent and result,
both A's intent and C's death must be described in artificial and
overly abstract terms, terms that do not jibe with our natural under-
standing of the events. A did not think of himself as trying to cause "a
net social harm"; C's family and friends would not have thought of
C's death as a "net social harm." Moreover, positive law uncontrover-
sially limits the criminal doctrine of transferred intent to cases where
the harm caused is of the same type as the harm intended. 77 Imagine
that A intends to set off a bomb to explode a building, and the bomb
74 See 1 LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 34, at 399.
75 See DON STUART, CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW 246 (1982) ("The doctrine of trans-
ferred malice should be rejected .... "); WiLLIAMs, supra note 4, at 134-36; Anthony
M. Dillof, Transferred Intent: An Inquiry into the Nature of Criminal Culpability, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 501, 510-36 (1998) (arguing against the moral soundness of transferred
intent); Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in
the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 712 (arguing that the doc-
trine of transferred intent is "theoretically incoherent"); David J. Karp, Note, Causa-
tion in the Model Penal Code, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1249, 1268-72 (1978) (arguing that in
such cases, transferred intent should be replaced by a rebuttable presumption of ag-
gravated recklessness).
76 The felony murder rule is an exception to this principle. The felony murder
rule, however, is generally condemned by commentators and confined by courts. See
James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the Forces That
Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1431 n.9 (1994) (citing exten-
sive literature critical of the felony murder rule).
77 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2) (a) (1962) (stating that the actual result may
diverge from intended "on the respect that a different person or different property is
injured or affected"). See generally Queen v. Faulkner, 11 Ir. R.-C.L. 8 (Cr. Cas. Res.
1877) (overturning the conviction of a sailor who accidentally set fire to his ship,
destroying it, while attempting to steal rum); Queen v. Pembliton, 2 L.R.-C.C.R. 119
[VOL. 77:51574
UNRAVELING UNKNOWING JUSTIFICATION
misfires and breaks B's leg. Even if breaking a person's leg constitutes
the same amount of net social harm as destroying a building, A, liable
for attempted arson and perhaps reckless assault, will not be punished
as the person who intends to break another's leg and does so. The
two cases are not analogous despite their involving the same net social
harm; only in the latter can the actor be said to be responsible for the
result because he intended it. Although it might be said that A in-
tended to cause a net social harm based on the destruction of the
building, and did cause such a harm based on the breaking of B's leg,
this attempt to bring A within the concurrence paradigm is artificial
and unpersuasive. These examples imply that (1) for results to be
relevant for criminal liability, they must be describable at a level of
concreteness such that it can fairly be said that they were intended (or
risked) by the actor, and (2) that "net social harm" is a description
that generally operates at too high a level of abstraction to be relevant
for the criminal law.
This lengthy analysis has a quick payoff for the problem of un-
knowing justification. Although the unknowingly justified actor
caused no net social harm, this is not the relevant description of the
results for determining liability. Rather, for purposes of determining
desert, we should say that the unknowingly justified actor caused a
result of a particular type (the destruction of a field, the killing of a
person) that was foreseen or intended and, additionally, caused a re-
sult of another type (the saving of a town, the preventing of an attack)
that was unforseen and unintended. Because the latter result was un-
forseen and unintended, it should be considered a mere accident that
happened to accompany an otherwise criminal act. Therefore the re-
sult-like the breaking of B's leg and the death of the unintended
victim-should be ignored by the criminal law when assessing liability.
F. The No-Wrongdoing Argument
Michael Moore presents a somewhat more sophisticated version
of the failed attempt analogy argument. As discussed below, Moore's
argument, rather than relying on the problematic concept of net so-
cial harm, employs the basic, ineliminable, moral concept of wrongdo-
ing. Based on this argument, Moore asserts the validity of the
objective theory of justification, under which the unknowingly justi-
fied actor is not liable.78 Indeed, Moore seems to take the hard-line
position that the availability of a justification defense to the unknow-
(Cr. Cas. Res. 1874) (overturning the conviction of a defendant who threw a stone at
a person and broke a window when he missed).
78 See MOORE, supra note 4, at 177-83.
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inglyjustified actor rests not merely on a plausible analogy but is virtu-
ally entailed by objective retributivism. 79
Moore's argument rests on a premise that is not challenged in
this Article. According to Moore, aside from attempts, the criminal
law properly prohibits only conduct that is objectively morally
wrong.80 Additional prohibitions of conduct unduly limit a person's
liberty and cannot be justified. This requirement makes sense. If the
criminal law is to have a basis in morality, what it prohibits must be
conduct that, in some moral sense, should not be performed.81 The
second step of Moore's argument relies on a particular view ofjustifi-
cation defenses. According to Moore, the legal category of justifica-
tions are just qualifications of the broadly and loosely stated rules
regarding morally wrong conduct contained in offense definitions. 82
There is, Moore argues, no substantive distinction between those ele-
ments of the ultimate moral norm that appear in the offense defini-
tion and those that appear in the justification definition.83 In other
words, the absence of justifying circumstances is an integral, undist-
inguished part of the immoral conduct. Thus, if the justifying circum-
stances occurred, there would be no wrongdoing to trigger an
objective retributivist response by the criminal law, regardless whether
the actor was aware of the justifying circumstances.
An example clarifies Moore's position. Although killing another
is, as a general rule, wrongful, it is not wrongful in all cases. An im-
79 See id. at 181 (noting that the contrary position "makes no sense to me").
80 See id. at 179, 243.
81 Conduct that is not immoral may properly be prohibited in limited circum-
stances. The best examples of such prohibitions are those employed to solve coordi-
nation problems. Coordination problems arise where the appropriate conduct for
each actor is indeterminate because such conduct depends on the appropriate con-
duct of others. To take a well-known example, it does not matter which side of the
road people drive on, as long as everyone drives on that side. Accordingly, the state
may properly prohibit driving on the left side of the road in order to establish a
conventional side for people to drive on. This prohibition would be proper despite
the fact that driving on the left side is not immoral in the absence of an existing
convention to the contrary. Discussions of coordination problems in law may be
found inJOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 231-59 (1980);JOSEPH RAZ,
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 49-50 (1986); Chiam Gans, The Normativity of Law and Its
Co-ordination Function, 16 ISRAEL L. REV. 333 (1981); Leslie Green, Law, Co-ordination
and the Common Good, 3 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 293 (1983). Enforcement of prohibi-
tions employed to solve coordination problems, however, need not fall to the criminal
law nor be considered instances of punishment. Thus, they are not necessarily
counter-examples to the claim that the criminal law should only punish immoral
conduct.
82 See MOORE, supra note 4, at 179.
83 See id.
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portant qualification of the general rule concerns the killing of an
unjustified attacker wielding lethal force. It is not wrongful to kill
such a person. Most penal codes reflect this moral fact by establishing
a general prohibition on killing and ajustification defense permitting
the killing of such attackers. A penal code, however, could alterna-
tively simply prohibit the killing of all "unjustified attackers threaten-
ing lethal force." The manner in which a penal code is drafted is
arbitrary from the perspective of morality. Under either formulation,
if an unjustified deadly attacker is killed, there simply has been no
objective wrongful conduct for the criminal law to address or redress,
regardless whether the defendant knew that the victim was an
attacker.
This argument may be generalized. Because the essential prohi-
bition of the criminal law is the prohibition of immoral conduct, and
justification defenses are no more than an optional tool of drafting,
we might imagine a unified idealized code that contained a single
provision:
Unified Code
(1) It is a felony to engage culpably in wrongful conduct.
If a standard instance of unknowingly justified conduct occurred
under this code, it would appear that there should be no liability be-
cause courts would only be authorized to impose a sanction, pursuant
to (1), where there has been wrongful conduct. Unknowingly justi-
fied conduct, such as killing an attacker, is not wrongful conduct be-
cause it is morally justified. Because the imagined code above
captures the essence of the criminal law, Moore might argue that
more elaborate and detailed criminal codes likewise should not
criminalize unknowingly justified conduct.
1. Rules of Conduct, Evaluation, and Legality
The force of Moore's position flows from the generally close con-
nection in law and morality between rules of conduct and rules of
evaluation (also known as rules of decision, rules of adjudication, or
rules of culpability). Rules of conduct include such prohibitions as
"do not lie" or "do not take what is not yours," which are addressed
and apply to persons generally and establish legal obligations that
bind law-abiding citizens irrespective of the existence of enforcement
sanctions.8 4 Rules of evaluation are rules such as "condemn liars" or
"imprison thieves" that apply either to persons or, more relevantly, to
84 See MOORE, supra note 19, at 405.
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state organs or officials such as courts or judges.s5 What triggers an
evaluation and what a person is evaluated in light of, it may be
thought, is a breach of the rules of conduct. Put in moral terms, what
retribution is exacted for, under this view, is exactly a breach of the
rules of moral conduct. Criminal codes are uniformly drafted to fos-
ter this appearance of a close analytic connection between rules of
conduct and rules of evaluation. A penal statute that states, "X is a
felony" simultaneously directs citizens not to engage in X and autho-
rizes a court to punish a person as a felon for engaging in X.86 This
tie between rules of conduct and rules of evaluation is bolstered by
the principle of legality.8 7 According to this principle, an individual
should only be punished for engaging in conduct previously prohib-
ited by statute.8 8 Thus, the proponent of punishing the unknowingly
justified actor would appear to be committed to either (a) expanding
the criminal law to prohibit nonwrongful conduct, such as unknow-
ingly justified conduct, or (b) to rejecting the principle of legality in
order to punish nonprohibited conduct, such as justified conduct.
Neither course seems acceptable.
Nevertheless, there is a way out. The dilemma created by the
principle of legality may be avoided by restructuring the criminal code
to break the connection between rules of conduct and rules of evalua-
tion. Imagine an alternative code that explicitly distinguished such
rules.8 9 The simplest such bifurcated penal code might have two
provisions:
Bifurcated Code
(1) Do not engage in morally wrongful conduct.
(2) Courts may penalize persons for engaging in morally wrongful
conduct.
85 See id. (comparing norms of wrongdoing and culpability); see also Meir Dan-
Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97
HARV. L. REV. 625, 625-30 (1984) (distinguishing conduct rules from decision rules).
86 For an argument rejecting the (intuitively obvious) thesis that laws direct citi-
zens to act in conformity with them, see, generally Gregory M. Silverman, Imperatives,
Normativity, and the Law, 31 CONN. L. REV. 601 (1999).
87 See Bernard E. Gegan, More Cases of Depraved Mind Murder: The Problem of Mens
Rea, 64 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 429, 460 n.109 (1990) ("A growing number of scholars have
criticized [the requirement of knowledge of the justifying circumstances] as violative
of the basic principle of legality.").
88 SeeJohn Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness and the Construction of Penal Stat-
utes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 190 (1985).
89 The idea of a penal code's explicitly distinguishing rules of conduct from rules
of evaluation is not as unusual as it may seem. See generally Paul H. Robinson et al.,
Making Criminal Codes Functional: A Code of Conduct and a Code of Adjudication, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 304 (1996) (advocating such a penal code).
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It would not be necessary, however, that the conduct and evalua-
tion provisions of a bifurcated code parallel each other as do the two
provisions above so that what is prohibited is what is sanctioned. In-
deed, an advantage of a bifurcated code, besides its theoretically
greater clarity, would be its potential to permit divergent conduct and
evaluation provisions. A bifurcated penal code might contain the fol-
lowing divergent provisions:
Divergent Bifurcated Code
(1) Do not engage in morally wrongful conduct.
(2) Courts may penalize persons for engaging in morally wrongful
conduct and for engaging in conduct that Would be morally
wrongful but for any justifying circumstances of which the actor
is unaware.
In this divergent bifurcated code, the scope of (2), the penalty author-
ization provision, is broader than (1), the conduct prohibition provi-
sion. Such a code initially may strike the reader as conceptually
confused. In what sense can conduct be penalizable, yet not prohib-
ited (or vice-versa)? Is such conduct "permissible" or not? But the
novel should not be mistaken for the nonsensical. There is no neces-
sary connection between the prohibited and the punishable. It is pos-
sible to be subject to a legal obligation that will not be enforced, just
as it is possible to be obligated by a promise even if breaching the
promise will result in no adverse consequences to the promisor.90
Likewise, as relevant here, one may have no legal obligation to act in a
particular way but merely a prudential incentive to not engage in acts
that would trigger a penal response.91
Even if logically coherent, would the divergent bifurcated code
set forth above be objectionable on the ground that it would unduly
infringe a citizen's liberty? Here questions of political legitimacy
arise, for it may be thought that the coercive power of the state can
only be validly triggered by the breach of the rules it has imposed on
90 Indeed, not only is it possible that a bifurcated penal code might punish what
was not explicitly prohibited, it is to be expected. An elegantly drafted bifurcated
code, while of course providing in the evaluation section that attempts should be
punished, would not contain rules of conduct that explicitly prohibited attempts.
Rules of conduct explicitly prohibiting attempts would be unneeded because in di-
recting P that conduct C not be engaged in, P is directed not to attempt to engage in
C. The commands "Do not kill" and "Do not attempt to kill" are equivalent com-
mands despite the fact that "Joe killed" and "Joe attempted to kill" are not equivalent
statements. Attempts therefore represent a natural case of divergence of conduct and
evaluation rules. See Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World Is Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 157, 187-93 (1994).
91 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-88 (1961) (distinguishing having a
prudential reason-being obliged-from having an obligation).
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its citizens. But this objection is unfounded. First, as a formal matter,
the code would not create legal obligations to refrain from conduct
that are more extensive than those created by the nondivergent bifur-
cated penal code presented earlier in the paragraph. Provision (1) of
each code establishes the legal obligations of citizens, and these provi-
sions are identical. In particular, as relevant to the current discussion,
under the divergent code a law-abiding citizen would not be, and
would not understand herself to be, under a legal duty to refrain from
unknowingly justified conduct. Provision (1) of the divergent code,
like that of the nondivergent code, merely prohibits citizens from en-
gaging in morally wrongful conduct. Such conduct does not include
any justified conduct, either known or unknown. Second, as a practi-
cal matter, under a divergent bifurcated code, it is not the case that a
citizen's liberty would be infringed relative to the standard
nondivergent code because of the fear of being penalized for unknow-
ingly justified conduct. Because unknowingly justified conduct is rela-
tively rare, it is unlikely as a practical matter that any person would be
deterred from engaging in any additional conduct that she was not
already deterred from based on likelihood that it was subject to sanc-
tion as morally wrongful conduct. Stated in other words, because by
definition you never know you will be engaging in unknowingly justi-
fied conduct, you will never be deterred from such conduct based on
the possibility that it is unknowingly justified conduct. The divergent
bifurcated code above punishes more conduct but does not deter
more conduct. Furthermore, to the extent it does deter additional
conduct that might have been engaged in on the off-chance it might
be unknowingly justified, virtually all of the conduct so deterred will
be wrongful conduct.
Even if not unduly liberty-infringing, would the penal code set
forth above violate the principle of legality? Let us imagine a citizen
who has engaged in unknowingly justified conduct, say burning an-
other's field to create a town-saving firebreak, and then is informed he
will be punished for his conduct despite the fact that the conduct in
those circumstances, owing to its overall good consequences, would
not be considered morally wrong and so is not prohibited. Arguably,
to sanction a citizen under those circumstances would violate the let-
ter of the legality principle because a court would be punishing con-
duct that is not specifically prohibited by the rules of conduct.
Nevertheless, such a code would not be inconsistent with the princi-
ple's spirit. According to Moore, the principle of legality rests on the
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values of liberty, democracy, equality, and fairness.92 None of these
values are offended by the divergent bifurcated code suggested in this
Article. Clearly, such a code could be adopted democratically and
would not promote unequal and arbitrary application of the law.
More to the point, not giving citizens the benefit ofjustifying circum-
stances that they were unaware of does not unfairly surprise them.
First, as discussed above, in any particular case of unknowing justifica-
tion they could not have relied on the presence of these circum-
stances. Second, citizens might have affirmative prior knowledge of
the provision of the penal code that permits punishing unknowingly
justified conduct. Third, even if they did not have such knowledge,
they would likely have no strong expectations regarding whether the
legal system incorporates a mixed or objective theory of justification.
Thus, being punished would not come as a surprise.93 Finally, the
content of the bifurcated code is determinate enough not to curtail
liberty by causing uncertainty regarding the law's application. For
these reasons, even when coupled with the requirement that only im-
moral conduct be prohibited, sanctioning the unknowingly justified
actor does not offend the legality principle's rationales of democracy,
equality and fairness.
In sum, the premise of Moore's argument94-only wrongful con-
duct should be prohibited-does not yield the conclusion of his argu-
ment-unknowingly justified conduct should not be punished.95 The
syllogism "what is justified is permissible, and what is permissible is not
punishable" was earlier considered and found unpersuasive when con-
strued as a matter of definition. 96 While Moore recasts the syllogism
as a matter of morality, it is no more compelling in this form. Un-
knowingly justified conduct represents a narrow exception to the le-
gality principle that only conduct made illegal by the legislature
should be punished. Even though unknowingly justified conduct
should not be prohibited, it can be punished. Such punishment
92 See MOORE, supra note 4, at 239-44. See generallyJeffries, supra note 88 (exam-
ining the rationales of the legality doctrine).
93 The Supreme Court recently affirmed the constitutionality of imposing crimi-
nal liability for conduct that was not prohibited when undertaken on the ground that
its subsequent judicial criminalization was not an unfair surprise. See Rogers v. Ten-
nessee, 532 U.S. 451, 467 (2001) (affirming a state supreme court decision abolishing
the common-law "year and a day" rule and holding it was not a prohibited ex post
facto law). The Court thereby implied the principle of legality was no broader than
the no-surprise rationale that arguably supports it.
94 See MOORE, supra note 4, at 179, 243.
95 See id. at 177-83.
96 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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neither unduly interferes with liberty nor offends any of the values
that underlie the legality principle.
2. Counter-Examples Involving Nonproximate Results
Having hopefully blunted the force of Moore's position, let me
now present a series of counter-examples to Moore's thesis that pun-
ishment based on objective features of a person's conduct is inappro-
priate where the conduct is not objectively wrongful. The first
counter-example is based on the lesser evil principle that conduct is
not objectively wrongful if it produces a net social benefit. Consider a
variation of the unknowing justification scenario in which Dl mali-
ciously burns his neighbor's field. In this variation, as a result of the
fire, the neighbor cancels his plans to take his family on a vacation
voyage on an ocean liner, the Titanium; the Titanium sinks and all its
passengers are drowned. Or, in another variation, the neighbor, as a
result of the fire, decides to move cross country where he wins a large
lottery and uses the proceeds to create a medical research facility
which discovers an important cancer treatment. In both variations, a
net social benefit occurred as a result of the burning of the neighbor's
field. The social benefits of saving his family from drowning or of
extending the lives of cancer victims far offset the cost of the de-
stroyed field. Thus, under an objective theory ofjustification, because
Dl's conduct was justified under the lesser evils principle, D1 would
not be punished. This is a counter-intuitive result. The next counter-
example is based on the defense-of-others principle that it is not im-
moral to kill a person-even a morally innocent one, such as a halluci-
natory aggressor-to save the life of a wholly innocent person.
Consider D2, who maliciously kills V, who, if he had not been killed,
would have many years later been responsible for a car crash killing
innocent person P1. D2 thus saved an innocent person's life by kill-
ing V, who was no more morally innocent than a hallucinatory aggres-
sor. Under the defense-of-others principle, D2's conduct would be
objectively justified. Again, if a person should only be punished for
conduct where that conduct is objectively immoral, it seems D2,
counter-intuitively, should not be punished for his conduct. Unknow-
ingly, he did the right thing.
Implementing Moore's theory into the criminal law would have
dramatic consequences. It is arguably impossible to assess all the fu-
ture consequences of an act.97 It is clearly impossible to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the net consequences of an action will be
97 As the philosopher G.E. Moore has written concerning ethical reasoning based
on consequential considerations:
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negative or that an innocent life will not consequently be saved if
those consequences extend to infinity. Indeed, it is not uncommon
that criminal acts will have net positive consequences if a particular
category of nonproximate results are considered. Many criminal acts
have the positive outcome of preventing further similar crimes by ei-
ther triggering greater precautions against similar crimes or deterring
those who have learned of the perpetrator's capture.98 If a penal code
incorporates some consequentialist considerations in defining prohib-
ited conduct and consequences include all of an act's results, it very
often will be impossible to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant is criminally liable. This is a plainly unpalatable conclusion
and may be considered a reductio ad absurdum implication of Moore's
position that the unknowingly justified act should be exonerated
based on the absence of objective wrongdoing.99
The first difficulty in the way of establishing a probability that one course of
action will give a better total result than another, lies in the fact that we have
to take account of the effects of both throughout an infinite future.... [I]t
is quite certain that our causal knowledge is utterly insufficient to tell us
what different effects will probably result from two different actions, except
within a comparatively short space of time.... Yet, if a choice guided by
such considerations is to be rational, we must certainly have some reason to
believe that no consequences of our action in a further future will generally
be such as to reverse the balance of good that is probable in the future
which we can foresee.... Our utter ignorance of the far future gives us no
justification for saying that it is even probably right to choose the greater
good within the region over which a probable forecast may extend.
MOORE, supra note 10, at 202.
98 A reductio ad absurdum application of this principle would have potentially every
criminal act justified on the ground that it resulted in the conviction and incapacita-
tion of the perpetrator. Such an argument was in fact suggested in Vaden v. State, 742
P.2d 784 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987), afJ'd, 768 P.2d 1102 (Alaska 1989). There, an under-
cover police officer shot four foxes illegally from a plane piloted by the defendant.
Id. at 785. The officer of course was not liable for killing the foxes because of the law
enforcement justification; the court, however, would not allow the defendant to raise
this defense to preclude his liability as an accomplice despite his being unknowingly
justified. Id. at 786.
99 It will not do to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Such a shift would
be unprincipled. The defendant has no better access than the prosecution to evi-
dence regarding the ultimate effects of his actions. Furthermore, to shift the burden
of proof to the defendant with respect to some issues is contrary to the premise of
Moore's position, which is that the absence of justifying conditions is an integral,
undistinguished part of the underlying norm that the criminal law enforces. See
MOORE, supra note 4, at 181. Nor will it do to shift the blame to the criminal law's
employment of consequentialist norms ofjustification. As noted earlier, the validity
of a theory of legal justification should not depend on the moral validity of a particu-
lar legal system's rules of'justification. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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One response to the above counter-examples is that they improp-
erly relied on justifying circumstances (lives saved, cancers treated)
that were not proximately caused. The criminal law, it may be argued,
is only concerned with proximately caused consequences. This point
is demonstrated by the fact that the criminal law will not punish a
person based on the nonproximate harms of her actions. Thus, with
respect to the scenarios of the previous paragraph, the relevant legal
norms are "do not proximately cause the destruction of property unless
the destruction proximately causes a social benefit outweighing the
harm" and "do not proximately cause the death of another unless so
doing is necessary to proximately prevent the death of an innocent per-
son." Because these more precisely stated norms were breached, it
may be argued, Dl and D2 should be liable for arson and murder,
respectively. Thus, by including the proximity requirement within the
rules of conduct, Moore's principle which would vindicate the un-
knowingly justified actor-"no punishment without wrongful con-
duct"-can be maintained.
The issue turns on whether considerations of proximity are part
of the norms that govern conduct and define wrongfulness. A person,
it is generally agreed, does not deserve to be punished based on the
nonproximate results of her actions. This fact, however, does not im-
ply that considerations of proximity are relevant to wrongfulness. De-
sert is a concept of two components. Many criminal law theorists
analyze desert in terms of wrongdoing and attribution (or harm and
responsibility). 100 Wrongdoing concerns the breach of the applicable
norms of conduct; attribution concerns the actor's accountability, re-
sponsibility, or blameworthiness for the breach. 10 1 Mens rea is the
standard example of an element of an offense that is relevant to attri-
bution rather than wrongdoing. A person does not deserve to be pun-
ished based on the unintended, unforeseen, or unforeseeable results
of his conduct, even if it is objectively wrongful. One way of putting
this point is that the norms of conduct do not include matters of attri-
bution, such as mental states. "Do not kill," rather than "do not inten-
tionally kill" or "do not knowingly kill," is the rule of conduct.102
Intent, knowledge, or lack thereof, is relevant only to the evaluation of
the actor.
Research has disclosed no specific discussion of whether the crim-
inal law's proximate causation requirement is relevant to the establish-
100 See FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 6.6, at 461; MOORE, supra note 4, at 243; ANDREW
VON HIRSCH, DOING JusTIcE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 79-81 (1976).
101 See Byrd, supra note 4, at 1290.
102 See FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 6.6, at 457.
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ment of wrongdoing or the attribution of wrongdoing.103
Nevertheless, a strong case can be made for its relevance to attribution
of wrongdoing. To the extent that the relevant norms enforced
through the criminal law are consequentialist, it seems irrelevant how
the morally relevant consequences come about. At the most basic
level, society arguably wants to increase happiness, protect innocent
lives, vindicate legitimate expectations, maximize efficiency, provide
opportunities for flourishing, preserve security, and so on. Whether
these ends are achieved through direct or indirect causal chains
should not matter. Consequences are consequences.
Furthermore, the requirement of causal proximity naturally fits as
a component of attribution. First, there is a close connection between
proximity and one concept clearly relevant to attribution: foreseeabil-
ity. Despite the wrongfulness of his conduct, we do not hold the actor
responsible for his conduct if it were unforeseeable that it would be
wrongful. According to a widely held view of proximate causation,
cause and effect are not proximately related if their connection could
not have been foreseen. 10 4 If norms of conduct do not include mens
rea terms such as foreseeability, it is unclear why they should include
foreseeability-derived terms such as proximate causation. Second,
conclusions about proximity are often described in terms of responsi-
bility or attribution. In determining whether an actor may fairly be
held accountable for a result, the nature of the causal chain between
the person's basic act and the result is clearly relevant. If the chain is
too attenuated or unusual, the result will not be attributed to the ac-
tor. Terms such as "blame" and "culpable for" are often employed to
express a judgment of attribution. It makes sense to say that an actor
"should not be blamed" for an occurrence that is causally remote or
that an actor is presumed to be "culpable for" the natural and direct
consequences of her acts. In this way, the proximity of a result, like
foreseeability of a result, seems to go to whether the conduct should
be attributed to the actor, not to whether the conduct is wrongful.
103 Moore indicates that causation is part of the actus reus. MOORE, supra note 4,
at 177. Fletcher refers to causation as relevant to objective attribution. FLETCHER,
supra note 5, § 5.3, at 386-87. Neither discuss the proximity requirement specifically.
Robinson defines causation with the proximity qualification in his adjudication sec-
tion of his model code, but suggests that the definition merely clarifies the meaning
of the rules of conduct. See Robinson et al., supra note 89, at 319, 345.
104 See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS 463-70 (2000); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 297-98 (5th ed. 1984) (analyzing
proximate causation in terms of foreseeability and comparing foreseeability to what
.any reasonable person would really have had.., in mind").
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Assuming that causal proximity is relevant to attribution and not
wrongdoing, it should no more matter for purposes of punishment
that a person's conduct was not wrongful based on consequences that
were unforeseen by the actor than that her conduct was not wrongful
based on consequences that were not proximately caused by the actor.
As discussed below, in both cases there is responsibility for some
harm, which, if not excused, should be the basis for punishment.
Thus, contrary to Moore's position, the fact that an unknowingly justi-
fied actor did not act wrongfully should not be a bar to punishment.
IV. AN ALTERNATiVE APPROACH
Thus far, this Article has been critical. Having surveyed the ap-
proaches to unknowing justification found in the existing literature, I
now will seek to articulate a theory of punishment and justification
that properly handles cases of unknowing justification.
A. The Harm Theory Explained
The theory I propose takes harm as the basic ground for punish-
ment and so may be called the harm theory of punishment. As the
name implies, the harm theory is a theory about the conditions for
just punishment and should not be confused with other "harm theo-
ries" which address the conditions under which the government may
legitimately limit liberty.10 5 The core idea of the harm theory is that it
is morally permissible or appropriate to harm a person to the extent
that that person is morally responsible for causing or risking harm to
another.10 6 By "harm," I mean suffering, disadvantage, a set back of
interests, or, more broadly, a state of affairs, such as the breaking of a
promise, that provides a moral reason, even if a defeasible one, for
not engaging in the act causing the state of affairs. 10 7 According to
105 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Alburey Castell ed., Harlan David-
son 1947) (1859) ("[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others.").
106 The theory is stated using the disjunction "permissible or appropriate" to allow
for negative and positive versions of the theory. A negative theory of punishment
provides necessary conditions for inflicting punishment; a positive theory provides
necessary and sufficient conditions. See Kevin Cole, The Voodoo We Do: Harm, Impossi-
bility, and the Reductionist Impulse, 5J. CONTEMp. LEGAL IssuES 31, 31-32 (1994) (distin-
guishing positive and negative theories of retribution); Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword:
The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 697, 698
(1994) (same).
107 See generally 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM
TO OTHERS 31-64 (1984) (discussing the concept of harm). In contrast to Feinberg's
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the harm theory, a person is "morally responsible" for the harm she
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causes or risks, ab-
sent a factor negating moral responsibility for the harm. Examples of
such factors are extreme youth, duress, reasonable mistake, and rea-
sonably believing the act is justified.
A system of criminal law based on the harm theory would resem-
ble in basic outline the Model Penal Code. Offenses would be formu-
lated in terms of the intentional, knowing, reckless, or negligent
engaging in harmful conduct, where such conduct is defined as that
which causes or creates a significant risk of more than de minimis
harm.10 8 The 'justification" defenses of a penal code, i.e., those con-
cerned with circumstances bearing on wrongdoing, would largely be
drafted in subjective terms in the manner of the Model Penal Code so
that they would, when applicable, negate moral responsibility. 10 9 For
example, "It is a defense to liability that the actor (reasonably) be-
lieved that his or her act was necessary to prevent a greater harm,"
might be how the justification defense of necessity would be formu-
lated. The harm theory thus reflects the subjective theory ofjustifica-
tion. The "excuse" defenses would be drafted in the usual manner,
for example, "It is a defense to liability that the actor was under ten
years of age," or "It is a defense to liability that the actor was insane."
Excuses, unlike justifications, would not necessarily refer to the actor's
beliefs or desires.
Under the harm theory, justification defenses construed as
wrongdoing-related defenses based solely on objective states of affairs
would exist in only a limited form. To the extent that offenses were
overbroadly formulated either to criminalize conduct that was not
harmful or to impose sanctions disproportionate to the harm caused
by some instances of the prohibited conduct, purely objective justifica-
tion defenses would be appropriate. For example, imagine that a stat-
ute criminalized eating in a restaurant or imposed the death penalty
definition of harm, see 1 id. at 34-35, my definition does not entail the proposition
that all harms are wrongfully or unjustly imposed. Thus, in my way of speaking, it is
not an oxymoron to say that a person was justifiably harmed. Feinberg's definition of
harm seems specially crafted to make plausible his "harm principle." See 1 id.
108 Other restrictions on "harm" besides the non-de minimis restriction may be
appropriate. For example, it may not be appropriate to criminalize the "harm" par-
ents do to their children when they raise them less than ideally or the "harm" a per-
son does to herself when she uses recreational drugs. A detailed theory of the scope
of harms that the criminal law should recognize is not needed for the purpose of this
argument.
109 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962) (establishing a defense for
"[c]onduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to
another" (emphasis added)).
2002] 1587
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
for firing a gun. In these cases, it would be appropriate to establish
specific justification defenses of "Paying for the food eaten" or "Not
killing any person by firing the gun." It should not be necessary that
the defendant have knowledge of the justifying circumstances set
forth in these defenses to invoke them because the harm that might
justify the sanction has not occurred. These defenses essentially trim
or refine offenses that are overbroad with respect to the harms (steal-
ing, killing) that underlie them. The general form of these harm-re-
finement justifications is, "Despite the prohibited conduct, the harm,
or risk of harm, that would morally justify the imposition of the sanc-
tion did not occur." Because it is likely that some actual offenses im-
pose penalties disproportionate to the harm caused by at least some
instances of the prohibited conduct, some unknowing justifications in
our current criminal scheme are likely appropriate even under the
harm theory. The circumstances relevant to such purely objective jus-
tification defenses, however, could easily be formulated as negative el-
ements or "exceptions" of the offense. With respect to these
circumstances, Moore is correct in stating that it is a matter of drafting
preference whether they are contained in the definition of the offense
or not.' ' 0
Critically, under a criminal law system modeled under the harm
theory, the major categories of'justifications, such as self-defense and
necessity, could not be characterized as harm-refinement justifica-
tions. Consider the case of burning the field and thereby saving the
town. This is not a case in which there was no harm or no harm pro-
portionate to the punishment for arson. Rather, the harm of burning
another's field occurred. Likewise, in the case of force used against
an attacker, the harm of being subjected to physical force or exper-
iencing pain occurred. Rather than indicating that the harms did not
occur, the circumstances of saving the town or preventing the attack
would be objectively justifying (though not liability-relieving) by virtue
of offsetting or overriding of the harms. This is the central distinction
between punishment theories such as Moore's and Robinson's and
the harm theory. Under Moore's and Robinson's theories, all justifi-
cations are refinements. For Moore, they are refinements of the con-
ditions of wrongdoing;' for Robinson, they are refinements of the
conditions of causing net harm." 2 Wrongdoing and net harm are
bottom-line negative moral judgments concerning conduct that, once
110 See MOORE, supra note 4, at 179.
111 See id. ("The justifications operate as exceptions to the rules describing such
acts as wrong ....").
112 See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 27 n.33.
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established, cannot be overridden. If an act is wrongful (for Moore)
or causes net social harm (for Robinson), then it must be prohibited
regardless of what other circumstances obtain. In contrast, harmful
acts may be either morally justified, as in cases where there are over-
riding or offsetting considerations, or morally impermissible, as in
cases Where there are no such considerations. Under the harm the-
ory, the justification of conduct becomes a matter not of construing it
in context as non-wrongful, but of overriding or offsetting the harm
that has been created. In this way, when an act is justified, there is still
something that persists-the harm-that may provide the basis for
punishment.
The harm theory implies an answer to the problem of unknowing
justification. The actor who satisfies the definitional elements of an
offense and who is unaware of circumstances that provide an offset-
ting reason to act, such as the prevention of a greater evil or the saving
of an innocent life, is not entitled to a defense. Rather, such an un-
knowingly justified actor should be subject to punishment just as any
other actor responsible for causing harm. This conclusion follows di-
rectly from the premise of the harm theory: a person should be pun-
ished for the harms for which he is responsible. The fact that her
conduct was objectively justified would be irrelevant because it would
neither negate the harm caused nor the actor's responsibility for that
harm.
B. The Ham Theory Compared
How does the harm theory compare with its competitors? As
noted, the penal code implied by the harm theory would resemble the
Model Penal Code. Despite this similarity, the harm theory is a funda-
mentally different theory of punishment than that of the Model Penal
Code drafters. The Model Penal Code is primarily constructed on the
utilitarian view that those who present dangers to society should be
incapacitated for the good of society.113 This premise easily generates
the conclusion that the unknowingly justified actor should have no
defense. The fortuity of justifying circumstances does not make the
actor any less dangerous to society. In contrast, the theory advanced
here is wholly retributive or desert-based. It is based on the nonconse-
quentialist idea that what harms you have imposed on others may or
113 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1) (b), (2) (a) (1962); 1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COmiENTAiEs §§ 1.01 to 2.13, at 18 (1985) (stating pervasive purpose of the grading
of particular offenses is the identification of "individuals whose criminal propensities
are relatively large"); 1 id §§ 6.01 to 7.07, at 20 (declaring that incapacitation and
individual deterrence are proper guides to sentencing).
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should be imposed on you. Thus, it is responsive to the intuitions
informing objective retributivism that the results of a person's actions
are relevant to determining his punishment for those actions. Such
retributive sentiments are largely foreign to the Model Penal Code.' 14
Though I will not argue for the superiority of retributivism over utili-
tarianism here,1 15 this superiority supports the harm theory, as
presented here, over the Model Penal Code.
The harm theory's differences with Moore's theory are more sig-
nificant for the operation of the criminal law. Earlier, this Article crit-
icized Moore's theory on the ground that it implied that
nonproximate results of conduct could render an actor immune from
punishment. 16 A more fundamental criticism, however, is that under
Moore's theory, the unknowingly justified actor unjustly escapes pun-
ishment. As discussed previously, the criminal law has two branches: a
branch directed to citizens concerning what acts are prohibited, and a
branch directed to officials regarding how they should treat citi-
zens.1 17 The first branch rests on a theory of immoral conduct; the
114 Although the drafters of the Model Penal Code eschew the view that the crimi-
nal law has a single view, see 1 id. §§ 6.01 to 7.07, at 22 n.18, they concede that the
Model Penal Code's approach to sentencing is "basically utilitarian or consequential-
ist." I id. §§ 6.01 to 7.07, at 2. Retributivism, in its limited negative form, is offered as
only an alternative to "enlightened utilitarian grounds" for limiting punishment, 1 id.
§§ 6.01 to 7.07, at 4, and even then the constraints of negative retributivism are not
considered absolute. 1 id. §§ 6.01 to 7.07, at 17-18. Positive retributivism, according
to which desert alone is a sufficient basis for punishment, is rejected wholesale as
"inhumane." 1 id. §§ 6.01 to 7.07, at 16.
115 The principle criticism of utilitarianism is that it is an impoverished moral the-
ory, incompatible with our commitment to personal liberty or the notion of moral or
legal rights. SeeJules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HorsTRA
L. REv. 509, 511 (1980). Utilitarianism also is viewed as suffering from the doctrinal
problems of determining which preference should count and whether total or aver-
age utility should be maximized, and the theoretical problem of interpersonal utility
comparisons. Id. For further criticism see H.J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach
to Punishment, in CONTEMPORARY UTILITARIANISM 239, 248-54 (Michael D. Bayles ed.,
1968). See generally Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian
Theory and the Problem of Crime Control 94 YALE LJ. 315 (1994) (arguing that because of
inefficient distribution of the cost of crime, it is impossible to achieve a low level of
crime under a utilitarian analysis); Andrew Von Hirsch, Desert, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
573 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 2d ed. 1980) (arguing that desert, instead of
utilitarianism, should determine punishment). The most sustained and successful at-
tack on utilitarianism as a general principle for ordering society is found in RAWLs,
supra note 12. While Rawls appears to endorse at least negative retributivism, see id. at
315 ("[I]n ajust society legal punishments will only fall upon those who display [bad
character]."), he does not address the topic at length.
116 See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
117 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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second rests on a theory of punishment. 'The harm theory is a theory
of punishment. With respect to prohibited conduct, wrongdoing is
the central concept (or net harm causing, if net harm causing consti-
tutes wrongdoing) because wrongdoing should be prohibited. Harm,
however, is the more appropriate basis for punishment because the
harm caused manifests the actor's culpability. That your action will
cause a death of a person is the affirmative reason for not engaging in
the act. Absent an excuse, you are culpable because in acting you
failed to grasp, regard, and appreciate this reason. The death makes
your immorality concrete and so triggers a retributivist response to the
manifestation of immorality in the world. Punishment in these cir-
cumstances is a way of communicating to the actor: "This harm is what
happens when you act on or in spite of such a reason. You are respon-
sible for it." Punishing based on harm is a way for society to symboli-
cally recognize and respond to the harm.118
A possible response to this view is to deny the moral significance
of harm causing. It may be argued that where an attacker has been
killed or where a town has been saved at the cost of a field, there has
been no manifestation of culpability, nothing to regret, no loss to be
responsible for and to suffer on account of. There has only been per-
missible conduct and acceptable results. But the existence of justify-
ing circumstances does not make harm evaporate. The clearest
examples of harm arise in cases of necessity. The burning of the field
and the saving of the town are temporally and spatially distinct events.
The saving of the town is a result that offsets the regrettable destruc-
tion of the field. Not to see that the destruction of the field is regret-
table because it was necessary is morally obtuse. 119 Although it was
not such a significant loss that it was wrong to bum the field, it still
carried moral weight. Likewise, the saving of the potential victim is a
result that offsets the regrettable taking of a life. There is something
valuable about the life of a person, even if that person is about to
attack another. It is not as if the attacker about to engage in his attack
is suddenly transformed into a nonperson so that killing him is
equivalent to killing a fly. Under most moral theories, a fly can be
killed even if its death serves no purpose. In contrast, as the criminal
118 For a discussion of the symbolic and expressive function of punishment, see
generally Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIsT 397 (1965),
reprinted in JOEL FEnERG, DOING AND DESERVING 95 (1970).
119 Cf Simester, supra note 5, at 303 (arguing that the owner of a diamond ring
stolen under duress "suffers a significant loss, one demanding the attention of our
criminal law").
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law recognizes, 120 a would-be attacker cannot be killed unless his at-
tack is thereby prevented. Killing a deadly human attacker may be no
more wrongful than killing a fly, but in taking a human life, it is more
harmful. A person should be treated in light of the morally significant
states of affairs she is responsible for causing. Harm is such a state of
affairs. This recognition undermines Moore's theory, which focuses
on wrongdoing to the neglect of harm causing.
Although Fletcher's theory agrees with the harm theory on the
critical point that the unknowingly justified actor should be punished,
it differs from the harm theory in two respects. First, most obviously,
it incorporates a subjective theory of justification rather than a mixed
one.121 Thus, the theory provides a different explanation of why per-
sons are exonerated in situations where both (1) they believe that
their conduct is objectively justified, and (2) it is objectively justified.
Fletcher would say that they would be exonerated because of both of
these facts, while the subjective theory would say that only (1) is rele-
vant.122 As argued earlier, 123 it is unclear how to give content to
Fletcher's view.
Second, and more relevant here, the harm theory and Fletcher's
theory differ regarding the nature of offenses. According to the harm
theory, a properly drafted penal code will establish offenses such that,
absent an excuse orjustification (subjectively defined), individuals sat-
isfying the definitional elements of an offense will deserve punish-
ment. The definitional elements of the offense therefore must be
themselves morally significant. This theoretical requirement is met by
drafting offenses in terms of the culpable causing or risking of harms
and setting appropriate penalties. Harm is an inherently moral con-
cept. It is conceptually prior to wrongdoing in the sense that only
through considering the harmful implications of a potential act can
one conclude whether it would be wrongful.
Fletcher's theory seems to lack a concept like harmful that is con-
ceptually prior to wrongful. Fletcher believes that the conduct de-
fined by offenses is conduct that is "typically" 124 wrongful, where
"typically" is a "statistical"125 matter or a matter of contingent social
120 See supra note 34 (discussing the traditional formulation of self-defense
doctrine).
121 FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 7.4, at 555-56.
122 See id.
123 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
124 FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 325; see also FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 7.4, at 562
("[T] he violation is typically sufficient to regard the act as wrongful.").
125 FLETCHER, supra note 17, at 329.
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norms. 12 6 For Fletcher, offenses seem to be merely useful rules of
thumb, or "paradigms,"'127 for approximating wrongdoing, but they
have no independent moral significance. Like Moore, Fletcher be-
lieves that justifying circumstances serve to mark out the exceptional
case where that which is typically wrongful is not actually wrongful.' 28
It follows from this perspective that where conduct is not typically
wrongful, it will be irrelevant what the actor knows of the circum-
stances of the act-there is not even prima facie liability. Marrying a
second time is an example Fletcher uses of such typically benign con-
duct. 129 According to Fletcher, an actor should not be liable for big-
amy based on marrying a second time regardless whether the actor is
aware or not that his earlier marriage has been legally terminated.
Different theories of offense generate different cases of conduct
for which an actor will be liable even if unknowinglyjustified. All con-
duct that is typically wrongful, hence establishing prima facie liability
for Fletcher, i30 will be conduct that risks or causes harm. In doing
what is typically wrongful, an actor significantly risks wrongdoing and,
in risking wrongdoing (where wrongdoing is the causing of unjusti-
fied harm), risks harm. But not all conduct that is harmful will signifi-
cantly risk being wrongful, a requirement for typicality. In particular,
harmful conduct that is normally justified will not be typically wrong-
ful. Consider the moderate disciplining of a child or the removal of a
diseased tooth. Both acts are harmful because they cause the subject
psychological or physical pain, and causing pain is a reason not to
engage in the conduct. But they are not typically wrongful because
the administering of moderate discipline and the extraction of a dis-
eased tooth (let us assume) are virtually always for the good of the
subject. Consider the cases of an angry parent who administers mod-
erate discipline believing it to be purely detrimental or a malicious
dentist who removes a diseased tooth believing it to be healthy. Each
is aware of the harm involved but unaware of the circumstances that
in factjustify the act. Under Fletcher's theory, such an actor is in the
position of the person who marries mistakenly believing he is engag-
ing in bigamy.' 31 No punishment is appropriate because there is
nothing typically wrongful in the acts. In contrast, the harm theory
would punish because the parent and dentist are responsible for caus-
126 FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 7.4, at 566 ("The question is whether in our society,
in the here and now, these forms of conduct are identifiable as typically wrongful.").
127 Id.
128 See id. § 7.4, at 562.
129 See id. § 7.4, at 557.
130 See id § 7.4, at 553.
131 See id. § 7.3, at 537.
2002] 1593
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ing significant pain. The pain is the external manifestation of the par-
ent's and the dentist's moral culpability. Punishing the parent and
the dentist like other unknowingly justified actors is the more princi-
pled, and hence preferable, result.
Another offense-related difference between Fletcher's theory and
the harm theory also concerns the place of consent. Fletcher asks
whether nonconsent should be an element of larceny, such that if it
does not occur there would be no liability, or whether consent should
be a justification, such that if it does unknowingly occur there could
be liability.' 32 Fletcher indicates that this methodology of looking to
what is typically wrongful and inconsistent with social mores does not
yield a clear answer.' 33 Such an answer, however, can be generated by
the harm theory. Under the harm theory, the question would be
whether the circumstance of consent should be described as negating
harm or as supplying a reason for acting in spite of the harm that
occurs. If the former, then consent would be a harm-refinementjusti-
fication and, under the harm theory, would be a defense even if the
consent was not known by the actor. If the latter, consent would be a
harm- offsetting justification and would be a defense only if the actor
was aware of it. Although there is no universal answer to the question
whether consent negates or offsets harm, distinctions between cases of
the former and the latter can systematically be made. Sometimes con-
sent is given because one desires what is consented to. For example, a
person might consent to sexual intercourse because of physical attrac-
tion to the other party. Sometimes, however, consent is given despite
one's antipathy to what is consented to. For example, a person might
consent to sexual intercourse because of the payment of a significant
sum. In these latter cases, what is prima facie undesirable becomes
acceptable based on overriding factors. Likewise, inflicting the un-
wanted, but consented-to, state of affairs on another is a reason not to
act, but a reason that is overridden by the existence of consent. Thus,
if a man has sex with a woman who wished to have sex with him, he
should not be convicted of rape even if he was unaware of her desire.
Because no harm was done, he should be liable for attempted rape at
most. In contrast, consider the case of a man who has sex with a wo-
man believing her to have submitted to his threats. In fact, she has
engaged in sex, despite her abhorrence of prostitution, because a
third party has offered her drugs to which she is severely addicted.
The man should have no defense to rape. He has caused the prosti-
tute to undergo a significantly distasteful (even if ultimately accept-
132 Id. § 7.4, at 568.
133 Id.
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able) experience, and he should be punished in light of its
occurrence. Thus, a merit of the harm theory is that it presents sys-
tematic methodology for resolving hard cases concerning when a
knowing justification is needed.
C. Knowledge vs. Justiflcatory Intent vs. Regard
Under the harm theory, as well as any other subjective or mixed
theory of legal justification, the question arises: what mental state
must be possessed by an actor whose conduct is justified in order for
that actor to qualify for a justification defense? The Model Penal
Code would allow an objectively justified actor to qualify for ajustifica-
tion defense where the actor merely knows of the justifying circum-
stances.' 34 Fletcher would insist on justificatory intent, that is, the
purpose to bring about those conditions (e.g., the prevention of the
assault or the saving of a life) that offset the harm associated with the
offense.'3 5 My version of harm theory proposes an alternative to these
traditional mental states: regard. Regard, defined more fully below,
requires more than mere knowledge but less than justificatory intent.
It strikes the right balance in determining which actors engaging in
justified conduct should be exonerated.
On the one hand, mere knowledge of the justificatory circum-
stances should not suffice to avoid liability. IfJim sets fire to his neigh-
bor's field with malicious intent, clearly it should not matter thatJim,
just after setting the field aflame, happens to glance over his shoulder,
sees an approaching forest fire in the distance, and realizes that the
fire he has just set will create a town-saving firebreak. His possessing
this bit of knowledge has no bearing on what punishment he deserves
because he only acquired the knowledge after the critical event from
the perspective of moral culpability: the choice to set the field on
fire.'3 6 Imagine now thatJim happens to see the forest fire just before
he acts but after he has made his choice to act. Jim possesses informa-
tion that is morally relevant, but so what? Again, the information did
not, in fact, enter into his decisionmaking process. For the purpose of
assessing culpability, it is as if Jim had an unread newspaper in his
back pocket reporting that such a fire was approaching. In both cases,
the knowledge, though "in Jim's possession," did not enter into his
134 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.02-.07 (1962). The Model Penal Code formu-
lates its requirement in terms of what the actor "believes" rather than knows in order
to reach those cases where the actor's belief is false. Id.
135 FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 7.4, at 564-66.
136 See generally Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, SoC., PHIL. & POL'Y,
Spring 1990, at 29 (discussing centrality of choice for moral culpability).
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decisionmaking process and so seems unconnected to the morally
critical moment of Jim's choice. Finally, imagine that Jim knows of
the approaching fire before he makes his decision to act, but Jim, in
making his decision, gives no significance or relevance to this fact.
That is, Jim disregards his awareness of the approaching fire and em-
ploys precisely the same reasoning and weighing of considerations
employed in the previous hypotheticals. There should be no differ-
ence in outcome. The knowledge of the approaching fire cannot be
exculpatory for Jim because it made no difference to him. Acting
merely with knowledge of the justifying circumstances is not enough.
The conclusion that an actor should not be exculpated merely
because she acted with knowledge of the justifying circumstances is
consistent with general principles of fault that inform the criminal
law. Where a person is held liable based on mere knowledge that a
harm will occur, her fault lies in failing to properly take into account a
morally relevant piece of information. For example, when a store
owner sets fire to her store for the insurance and thereby causes the
deaths of the employees inside, she can be criticized for not taking the
employees' presence into account when deciding whether to burn
down the store. Likewise, Jim, in setting the fire in the last scenario,
knew he would be creating a firebreak, but this fact failed to play any
role in his practical reasoning in deciding to set the fire. His fault is of
a kind with the storekeeper's. Jim's knowledge of the justifying cir-
cumstances did not make a difference to him, and so it should not
make a difference to our evaluation of him.1 37
On the other hand, full justificatory intent should not be re-
quired to avoid liability. The most cogent reason for this is not the
one discussed by Robinson.13  Robinson argues that ifjustificatory in-
tent were required, a person motivated by the desire to do harm and
aware of the existence of justifying circumstances would be deterred
from acting, thus resulting in a loss to society. 139 For example, Tim, a
malicious person who would like to destroy his neighbor's field, would
not do so where so doing would save the town because he would know
that he would be still liable for arson under a theory of justification
requiringjustificatory intent.140 Robinson regards this conclusion as a
strike against an intent requirement. That a particular version of re-
137 See Kenneth C. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory: The Problem of Criminal
Negligence, 5J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 365, 390-92 (1994) (discussing the moral sig-
nificance of a belief's role in an actor's practical reasoning and reaching similar con-
clusions to those in this Article).
138 See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 18.
139 See 2 id.
140 See 2 id. at 14-15, 18.
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tributivism would be inconsistent with maximizing social welfare, how-
ever, is not a criticism of that version. 141 It is commonplace that many
forms of retributivism place limits on punishment that bar socially op-
timal levels of deterrence from being achieved. 142 Where this hap-
pens, hardcore retributivists bite the bullet and argue that less-than-
maximum social welfare is the cost of justice. Less dogmatic retribu-
tivists may limit the scope of their retributivism to situations where the
cost is not too high. In neither case, however, is the form of retributiv-
ism itself rejected. At most, Robinson's hypothetical presents yet an-
other case where the divergence of retributivism and utilitarianism
would have to be acknowledged. Without such a divergence, no re-
tributive theory would have any practical interest when compared to
contending utilitarian theories. A limited divergence from utilitarian-
ism is a point for, not against, a justificatory intent theory of
justification.
A better argument against the requirement ofjustificatory intent
may be formulated within the framework of retributivism. An actor
who engages in justified conduct should not be required to act for the
purpose of achieving the results underlying the justification defense.
A lower standard should suffice. No common English term, however,
quite captures the mental state meeting this standard. Let us say then
that an actor "regards" the justificatory circumstances surrounding his
conduct where (1) he believes justifying circumstances exist, and (2)
based on his belief, he decides to engage in the conduct.143 "Regard"
may be thought of as shorthand for the more bulky phrase "takes into
account in his reasoning process when deciding what to do" or "func-
141 See 2 id. at 18.
142 Prime examples are crimes such as property crimes where the gain to the per-
petrator is comparable to the loss of the victim. Assuming a simple form of retributiv-
ism, according to which the harm caused places a ceiling on the penalty, if the harm
deserved is equal to the harm caused and that some percentage of such crimes will
not result in convictions, a rational non-risk-adverse person would not be deterred
from committing the crime.
143 Regard may be compared to Alan Michaels's concept of acceptance. Michaels
believes that persons who "accept" that their acts may constitute the actus reus of an
offense should be treated like those who know that they do. With respect to conduct,
Michaels defines "acceptance" as the state where (1) a person acts recklessly with re-
spect to whether his act constituted such conduct, and (2) the person would have so
acted had the person been aware that the conduct was of that nature. See Alan C.
Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 953, 961 (1998). Ac-
ceptance is like regard in that it has (1) an epistemic component, and (2) a
counterfactual component. The second component of regard, "'based on his belief,
he decides to engage in the conduct'" is roughly equivalent to "if not for his belief, he
would not have decided to engage in the conduct."
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tions as a reason (even if not the sole reason) relevant to the actor's
choice." Although regard includes purpose, purpose does not entail
intent. Suppose, for example, that Mike dislikes Vincent, but restrains
himself from attacking Vincent because he believes people are gener-
ally entitled to physically security. One day Mike sees that Vincent is
about to assault Mary, whose fate Mike is completely indifferent to.
Seizing the opportunity, Mike punches Vincent and prevents the as-
sault. Here Mike has regarded the justifying circumstances-Vin-
cent's imminent assault of Mary-for the circumstances made a
difference to him. Mike's belief that Vincent was acting impermissibly
eliminated the consideration (respect for Vincent's physically secur-
ity) that had prevented Mike from acting on other occasions. Mike,
however, did not act with the purpose to protect Mary. Protecting
Mary was but a foreseeable side effect of his conduct. The regarding
of justificatory circumstances, in the absence of justificatory intent,
may thus involve the defeating of a reason that had constrained action
and need not provide an affirmative reason for action.
If an actor, such as Mike, regards the justificatory circumstances
surrounding his contemplated conduct, he should not be blamed or
punished for choosing to engage in it. Critically, the actor has not
chosen to engage in conduct understood to be morally impermissible.
In deciding how to act, persons, in the first instance, must abide by
the distinction between the permissible and the wrongful, the primary
distinction demarcated by the criminal law's rules of conduct. If they
have honored this distinction, the criminal law should not consider
them blameworthy.144
Consider the case of Rich, who opens a business for the sole pur-
pose of taking customers from Penny, a person he dislikes. Let us
assume, as is generally thought, that this conduct is a morally permissi-
ble exercise of liberty despite the adverse effects on Penny. In decid-
ing to open the business, Rich did not choose to cross the line
between permissible and wrongful action; Penny, he realized, had no
144 An exception should apply where the actor's belief in the justifying circum-
stances is negligent or reckless and the offense he is charged with permits liability
based on negligence or recklessness. Cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (1962) (reck-
less or negligent use of otherwise justifiable force). Thus, if Bernhard Goetz had un-
reasonably, but correctly, believed he was going to be attacked with deadly force and
killed one of his attackers and had taken this fact into account in deciding to shoot,
he should have been liable for negligent homicide. He intentionally killed a person
and so should bear prima facie responsibility for that harm. Although he believed he
was being attacked and acted based on this belief, the belief was unreasonable and so
only partially excuses his conduct. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 43-44 (N.Y.
1986) (providing facts of the case).
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right to be free of competition. Admittedly, by maliciously acting to
cause economic harm to Penny, Rich deserves our disapproval. He,
however, has not disrespected the rights of anyone and so does not
deserve the qualitatively higher degree of approbation appropriate to
a person who has chosen to violate the rights of others. 145 An actor,
such as Mike, who takes into account the justifying circumstances
when engaging in justified conduct is in the same situation as Rich.
Although harm was intended, his action was only taken in light of the
legitimate opportunity to cause that harm. Like Rich, he does not
deserve to be punished.
Extending justification defenses to actors who merely regard the
justifying circumstances is fully consistent with acknowledging the sig-
nificant difference between merely regarding the justifying circum-
stances and acting withjustificatory intent. Only in the latter case may
an actor be a candidate for praise. The criminal law sets minimum
standards for conduct which even those of the worst character are sup-
posed to regard and respect. In contrast, acting with justificatory in-
tent may reflect an above-average character deserving of praise. The
doling out or withholding of praise is the responsibility of a wide
range of social institutions, many of which are nongovernmental, in-
formal, or discretionary in nature. In contrast, the criminal law is lim-
ited to the business of imposing punishment when punishment is just.
The boundary of just punishment stops exactly at the point where a
person, in causing harm, acts with regard for the justifying
circumstances.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to examine a variety of approaches to the
problem of unknowing justification and to advance one as superior.
The approach advocated, the harm theory, in general, would not
grant a defense to the actor who has engaged in harmful conduct
that, unknown to him, was objectively justified. The harm theory is
not logically contradictory. Defining 'justified" to imply "permissi-
ble," and "permissible" to imply "not punishable," cannot solve the
moral issue presented by the problem. By the same token, the harm
theory is not logically compelled. The alternative position that the
unknowingly justified actor is not liable does not lead to contradic-
tion. The recursive structure of justification in criminal law enables
cases of conflicting forces to be unproblematically analyzed as com-
145 Of course, as argued earlier, if the actor is not aware of facts that render him
within his rights, he is due full approbation, and his punishment is to be measured by
the harm he has caused. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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prised of justified and unjustified actual and potential forces. The
harm theory, however, is morally compelling. When reasons not to
act are ignored and these reasons are objectively manifested as harms,
a punitive response is appropriate absent any excusing conditions.
The harm theory has three salient characteristics. First, it sharply
distinguishes between rules of conduct (norms) on one hand and
rules of evaluation (punishment conditions) on the other in order to
allow a substantive divergence between them. Second, it rests on a
concept, harm, that is a full-blooded moral concept on par with
wrongdoing. Third, by focusing on harm, it admits the possibility of
an unknowing justification defense in those limited cases where sanc-
tion for the offense is disproportionate to the harm actually caused by
virtue of unknown harm-mitigating circumstances. By virtue of these
characteristics, this Article argued that the harm theory yields a system
of punishment that properly reflects the culpability of an actor for his
conduct. One cannot expect to convince all of one's readers of all of
one's conclusions all of the time. A more modest goal would be to
establish that any coherent theory ofjustification that maintains liabil-
ity for the unknowingly justified actor must incorporate the character-
istics and paths of argument found in the harm theory and presented
herein. It is hoped that this more modest goal has been fully
achieved.
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